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Substantive Equality As Equal 
Recognition: A New Theory of Section 15 
of the Charter
ANTHONY ROBERT SANGIULIANO*
This article presents a novel theory of the concept of substantive equality under section 
15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms called Substantive Equality as Equal 
Recognition. This contribution is timely in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent 
disagreement over the proper jurisprudential approach to interpreting section 15(1) in the 
2013 case of Quebec v A. Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition holds that the purpose 
of section 15(1) is to ensure that the law’s application does not reflect, through its impact or 
effects, hierarchies of status that exist between citizens within Canadian society. The article 
argues that the theory is disclosed by the doctrinal principles laid down by Justice McIntyre in 
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, the first decision on section 15(1) of the Charter. It 
also argues that the account of the wrongfulness of discrimination generated by Substantive 
Equality as Equal Recognition is preferable to other accounts and that the theory can help 
navigate the disagreement between the judges in Quebec v A.
Cet article propose une théorie novatrice pour expliquer le concept de l’égalité réelle selon 
l’article 15(1) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, qui assimile l’égalité réelle à une 
reconnaissance égale. Cette contribution arrive en temps voulu alors que la Cour suprême 
du Canada se trouvait en 2013 en désaccord relativement à l’approche jurisprudentielle à 
adopter pour interpréter l’article 15(1) dans l’affaire Québec v A. L’égalité réelle assimilée 
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à une reconnaissance égale prétend que l’objectif de l’article 15(1) consiste à faire en sorte 
que l’application de la loi ne reflète pas, par son impact ou ses effets, une hiérarchisation du 
statut des citoyens dans la société canadienne. L’article prétend que cette théorie découle 
des principes doctrinaux établis par le juge McIntyre dans la cause Andrews c. Law Society 
of British Columbia, premier verdict s’appuyant sur l’article 15(1) de la Charte. Il prétend 
également que le rapport de discrimination illicite découlant de l’égalité réelle assimilée 
à une reconnaissance égale est préférable à d’autres rapports et que cette théorie peut 
permettre d’aplanir le désaccord des juges dans Québec v A.
At the end of the day there is only one question: Does the challenged law violate the 
norm of substantive equality in s. 15(1) of the Charter?
—Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Abella1
Discrimination is unacceptable in a democratic society because it epitomizes the 
worst effects of the denial of equality, and discrimination reinforced by law is 
particularly repugnant. The worst oppression will result from discriminatory measures 
having the force of law. It is against this evil that s. 15 provides a guarantee.
—Justice McIntyre2
1. Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 13 at para 2, [2011] 1 SCR 396 [Withler] 
[emphasis added].
2. Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at para 35, 56 DLR (4th) 1 
[Andrews] [emphasis added].
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THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S interpretive approach to 
section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 has been character-
ized by continual reinvention.4 The test for whether a law is discriminatory within 
the meaning of section 15(1) has been in flux since its inception in Andrews v 
Law Society of British Columbia,5 as the Court has struggled to achieve consensus 
on the best doctrinal methodology for identifying the type of inequality that the 
provision aims to prevent.6
This struggle is exemplified by the recent case of Quebec (Attorney General) v A.7 
Justice LeBel wrote the dissenting opinion on the section 15(1) infringement 
issue in that case.8 He began his reasons by explicating what he took to be the 
3. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c 
11 [Charter]. Section 15(1) of the Charter provides: “Every individual is equal before and 
under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”
4. Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “The Continual Reinvention of Section 15 of 
the Charter” (2013) 64 UNBLJ 19 [Koshan & Watson Hamilton, “Continual Reinvention”].
5. Andrews, supra note 2.
6. Koshan and Watson Hamilton identify three divergent approaches to interpreting s 15(1). 
Koshan & Watson Hamilton, “Continual Reinvention,” supra note 4 at 19. After it agreed 
on the s 15(1) test in the 1989 Andrews case, the Court was severely fractured in the 1995 
Equality Trilogy—Miron, Egan, and Thibaudeau. See Miron v Trudel, [1995] 2 SCR 418, 
124 DLR (4th) 693 [Miron]; Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513, 124 DLR (4th) 609 
[Egan]; Thibaudeau v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 627, 124 DLR (4th) 449. A unanimous Court 
reinvented the test in Law in 1999, only to alter it again in Kapp in 2008. See Law v Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497, 170 DLR (4th) 1 [Law cited 
to SCR]; R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483 [Kapp]. See also The Constitutional 
Law Group, Canadian Constitutional Law, 4th ed, by Patrick Macklem et al (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 2010) at 1237-1335.
7. 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 SCR 61 [Quebec v A].
8. Readers may find it curious that I begin by discussing the dissenting opinion in Quebec v 
A. LeBel J’s reasons on how to determine whether s 15(1) is infringed, with which Fish, 
Moldaver, and Rothstein JJ concurred, in fact formed part of the majority judgment. For 
LeBel J, s 15(1) was not infringed in the case. It was therefore not necessary to determine 
whether the infringement was justified under s 1 of the Charter, which provides that Charter 
rights are subject to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.” McLachlin CJ concurred with the reasons of Abella 
J, discussed below, to form a majority on how to determine whether s 15(1) is infringed. The 
majority on s 15(1) found that s 15(1) was indeed infringed, which necessitated an analysis 
of the infringement’s justification under s 1 of the Charter. However, McLachlin CJ disagreed 
with the majority position on the infringement of s 15(1) when she considered the s 1 
analysis, holding that the infringement was justified. The result of this change of position was 
that the view of LeBel J that s 15(1) was not infringed and the view of McLachlin CJ that 
any infringement was justified generated the final disposition of Quebec v A, according to 
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underlying values of section 15(1). While he endorsed the prevailing view that 
section 15(1) guarantees substantive equality rather than mere formal equality in 
the law’s application, he added that the provision’s purpose is to protect the value 
of human dignity, to which the principle of personal autonomy is linked.9 He 
affirmed the two-step test developed in R v Kapp for whether a law discriminates 
against a claimant under section 15(1):
• Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or 
analogous ground of discrimination?
• Does the distinction discriminate by imposing disadvantage 
through the perpetuation of prejudice or stereotyping?10
He also affirmed the four contextual factors developed in Law v Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) to aid in identifying discrimination.11 
More contentiously, however, he insisted that a law is not discriminatory unless 
it involves prejudice or stereotyping against the claimant, even if it imposes a 
disadvantage on the claimant. Proof of disadvantage is insufficient because 
prejudice or stereotyping is a “crucial, although not the only, factor to be 
considered”12 when a court analyzes an equality claim.
which the impugned law at issue was constitutionally valid. For a discussion of the difficulties 
involved in identifying the ratio of Quebec v A, see Michelle Biddulph & Dwight Newman, 
“Equality Rights, Ratio Identification, and the Un/Predictable Judicial Path Not Taken: 
Quebec (Attorney General) v. A and R. v. Ibanescu” UBC L Rev [forthcoming in 2015].
9. LeBel J wrote that “[s]afeguarding personal autonomy implies the recognition of each 
individual’s right to make decisions regarding his or her own person, to control his or her 
bodily integrity and to pursue his or her own conception of a full and rewarding life free 
from government interference with fundamental personal choices.” Quebec v A, supra note 
7 at para 139. His additional appeal to human dignity is contentious because, in Kapp, the 
Court appeared to remove the violation of human dignity as an independent factor to be 
considered when determining whether a law infringes s 15(1). Kapp, supra note 6 at paras 
21-25. LeBel J’s claim in Quebec v A is not that human dignity is part of the legal test under 
s 15(1) but that it informs the purpose of the provision. Nevertheless, given that the Court 
has distanced itself from the concept of human dignity when it comes to the constitutional 
protection of equality, the claim might still be met with some suspicion. I return to this issue 
in Part III(B)(1), below.
10. Kapp, supra note 6 at para 17.
11. These contextual factors are: (a) the presence or absence of pre-existing disadvantage 
experienced by the claimant; (b) the correspondence or lack thereof between the ground on 
which the discrimination claim is based and the actual needs, capacity, or circumstances of 
the claimant or affected group; (c) whether the impugned law has an ameliorative purpose 
or effect for certain members of society; and (d) the nature of the interest of the claimant 
affected by the law. Law, supra note 6 at para 88.
12. Quebec v A, supra note 7 at para 185.
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Justice Abella wrote the majority opinion on the section 15(1) infringement 
issue.13 She likewise endorsed the Kapp test and the Law contextual factors in her 
majority judgment. Unlike Justice LeBel, she did not articulate the core values of 
section 15(1) beyond holding that the purpose of the provision is to protect the 
norm of substantive equality. She rejected the view that prejudice or stereotyping 
are necessary elements which the claimant is obligated to demonstrate, preferring 
to regard them as indicia that help determine whether a law violates substantive 
equality.14 Since prejudice and stereotyping are disadvantaging attitudes, a 
requirement that the claimant demonstrate them would be unduly formalistic 
and contrary to a substantive equality approach, which focuses on discrimina-
tory effects.15 For Justice Abella, rejecting the dissent’s view led to “a flexible 
and contextual inquiry into whether a distinction has the effect of perpetuating 
arbitrary disadvantage on the claimant.”16 Hence, section 15(1) is infringed 
if a law that makes a distinction on a prohibited ground violates substantive 
equality, no matter which factors are used to identify the violation and, specifi-
cally, whether or not the violation takes the form of prejudice or stereotyping 
against the claimant.
My interest in canvassing the disagreement between the judges in Quebec v 
A is not to assess the factual outcome of the case (others have ably undertaken 
this task17), but to highlight the ambiguity in the conceptual trajectory of the 
Charter’s constitutional guarantee of equality.18 Justice LeBel tried to secure 
a degree of certainty for the section 15(1) test by thoroughly articulating the 
provision’s purposes and solidifying prejudice or stereotyping as critical factors 
that make a law discriminatory. Justice Abella, however, preserved a flexible 
approach to section 15(1) that enables judges to identify the disadvantaging 
impact of a law and avoids imposing additional burdens of proof on equality 
13. Abella J’s reasons, however, formed part of the dissent in the result of Quebec v A. See supra 
note 8 and accompanying text.
14. Quebec v A, supra note 7 at para 325.
15. Ibid at para 329. Such rejection is similar to how the human dignity test was rejected by the 
Court in Kapp. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
16. Quebec v A, supra note 7 at para 331.
17. See e.g. Robert Leckey, “Strange Bedfellows” (2014) 64:5 UTLJ 641; Sonia Lawrence, 
“Quebec v. A roundtable: Leckey on the Symbiosis of Law and Social Forces” Institute 
for Feminist Legal Studies at Osgoode (6 June 2013), online: <ifls.osgoode.yorku.ca/
quebec-v-a-roundtable-leckey-on-the-symbiosis-of-law-social-forces>.
18. For similar conceptual diagnoses of the Quebec v A decision, see Bruce Ryder, “The Strange 
Double Life of Canadian Equality Rights” (2013) 63 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 261 at 285-91; 
Jennifer Koshan, “Under the Influence: Discrimination under Human Rights Legislation and 
Section 15 of the Charter” (2014) 3:1 Can J Hum Rts 115 at 134-37.
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claimants.19 Quebec v A therefore indicates that the tension the Court must 
navigate to avoid ambiguity in its equality jurisprudence is the tension between 
certainty and flexibility. As Colleen Sheppard argues, the injunction to examine 
the discriminatory impact of a law using any relevant factors does not provide 
sufficient guidance to litigants and adjudicators in equality cases. But the Court 
must also avoid retreating to the certainty afforded by formalism, as this does 
not generate equitable outcomes or allow for an appreciation of the complex 
structural and systemic inequalities in society.20
Sheppard’s own suggestion for navigating the tension between certainty 
and flexibility is to insist on clarifying the promise of substantive equality.21 
This article takes inspiration from Sheppard’s suggestion. It is indeed essential 
to frame a conceptually rigorous understanding of substantive equality as it 
operates in Canadian equality jurisprudence. The protection of this value has 
been explicitly regarded as a central objective of section 15(1) ever since the 
1997 case of Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General),22 and important 
subsequent cases affirm this idea.23 Both the majority and dissent in Quebec v 
A relied on a commitment to substantive equality. This commitment is clearly 
evinced in Withler v Canada (Attorney General), where the Court stated that 
“the central issue in this and other s. 15(1) cases is whether the impugned law 
violates the animating norm of s. 15(1), substantive equality.”24 The Court has 
also consistently emphasized that substantive equality mandates a contextual 
19. Quebec v A, supra note 7 at para 329.
20. Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in 
Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) at 61.
21. Ibid. Sheppard defends a concept called “inclusive equality,” which “emphasizes the integral 
connection between process and substance” (ibid at 61). For another example of a scholar 
who pursues the goal of clarifying the promise of substantive equality, see Margot Young, 
“Unequal to the Task: ‘Kapp’ing the Substantive Potential of Section 15” (2010) 50 Sup Ct L 
Rev (2d) 183 at 190-99.
22. [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR (4th) 577 [Eldridge cited to SCR]. In Eldridge, LaForest J 
stated that the provision is “intended to ensure a measure of substantive, and not merely 
formal equality” (ibid at para 61). See also Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493 at para 83, 
156 DLR (4th) 385 [Vriend]; Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), 
[1999] 2 SCR 203 at para 92, 173 DLR (4th) 1 [Corbiere]; Winko v British Columbia 
(Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 SCR 625 at para 82, 175 DLR (4th) 193.
23. Law, supra note 6 at para 25; Kapp, supra note 6 at paras 14-16.
24. Withler, supra note 1 at para 2. See also Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, 
“Meaningless Mantra: Substantive Equality after Withler” (2011) 16:1 Rev Const Stud 31 at 
44, 49 [Koshan & Watson Hamilton, “Meaningless Mantra”].
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approach to analyzing equality claims that focuses on identifying an impugned 
law’s discriminatory effects.25
In addition to informing the purpose of section 15(1), substantive equality 
now forms the essential element of the legal test for whether a law is discrimina-
tory.26 In Withler, the Court stated that, while it did not wish to restrict the factors 
that may aid in assessing a claim of discrimination, inquiries into the perpetua-
tion of prejudice and stereotyping are specifically directed towards ascertaining 
whether an impugned law violates the norm of substantive equality.27 Justice 
Abella relied on this dictum in Quebec v A when she argued that a violation of 
substantive equality, no matter how it is identified, is what causes a law to conflict 
with the Charter.28 Hence, as stated in this article’s first epigraph, to determine 
whether a law violates section 15(1), there is only one question: Does the law 
violate the norm of substantive equality?
In this article, I intend to contribute to the goal that Sheppard and others 
have pursued of clarifying the concept of substantive equality. These introduc-
tory remarks have shown that the Court’s recent section 15(1) judgments in 
Quebec v A are strongly indicative of a need for the contribution, at least on one 
reading of that decision.
I. A JURIDICAL CONCEPTION OF SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
Substantive equality is widely seen as a methodological principle directing courts 
to analyze section 15(1) in a way that invokes “the contextualization of equality 
claims” and ensures “equality of results or outcomes.”29 Despite recent descrip-
tions of substantive equality as a norm, there has been no comparable agreement 
25. See especially Law, supra note 6 at para 55; Withler, supra note 1 at paras 45-54.
26. As early as Law, Iacobucci J held that “the existence of a conflict between an impugned law 
and the purpose of s. 15(1) is essential in order to found a discrimination claim.” Law, supra 
note 6 at para 41.
27. Withler, supra note 1 at para 39.
28. Quebec v A, supra note 7 at para 327.
29. Beverley Baines, “Is Substantive Equality a Constitutional Doctrine?” in Ysolde Gendreau, 
ed, La doctrine et le développement du droit/Developing Law with Doctrine (Montreal: Les 
Editions Thémis, 2005) 59 at 79. See also Young, supra note 21 at 196; Sheppard, supra 
note 20 at 39-40, 47, 51-52; Koshan & Watson Hamilton, “Meaningless Mantra,” supra 
note 24 at 44; Koshan & Watson Hamilton, “Continual Reinvention,” supra note 4 at 
25-26; R v Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR 1296 at 1328, 69 CR (3d) 97; Law, supra note 6 at 
para 25; Kapp, supra note 6 at paras18-20; Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v Canada, 
2009 SCC 9 at para 194, [2009] 1 SCR 222; Withler, supra note 1 at para 2; Quebec v A, 
supra note 7 at para 342.
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on substantive equality as a state of affairs, i.e., what a situation in which the 
ideal is instantiated through law would look like, as opposed to the ideal’s 
methodological dimension. Nor has substantive equality been given a positive 
definition by the Court.30 Rather, it has been defined negatively as an approach 
to section 15(1) contrasting with a formal equality approach.31 Formal equality 
itself is construed both methodologically, as the “decontextualized application of 
objectified rules and definitions,”32 and positively, as a state of affairs in which 
those similarly situated are treated alike.33
Elucidating in positive terms the distinctive state of affairs that substantive 
equality represents is a key element of my ambition to clarify substantive 
equality in this article. To realize this ambition, I propose to develop a juridical 
conception of substantive equality. A juridical conception of a normative ideal 
such as substantive equality seeks to disclose the latent normative presuppositions 
of law’s internal doctrinal principles and to bring them to the surface through 
a process of abstraction.34 The doctrinal principles that I analyze are those 
outlined by Justice McIntyre in Andrews, the first decision on section 15(1) of the 
Charter. I select this route because the Court has continually referred to Andrews 
to substantiate assertions about the correct way to analyze equality claims and 
about the purpose of section 15(1).35 In Kapp, the Court stated: “Andrews set 
the template for this Court’s commitment to substantive equality—a template 
which subsequent decisions have enriched but never abandoned.”36 In Withler, 
30. Baines, supra note 29 at 91; Koshan & Watson Hamilton, “Meaningless Mantra,” supra note 
24 at 32; Koshan & Watson Hamilton, “Continual Reinvention,” supra note 4 at 21. Margot 
Young describes the Court’s use of the concept as an “unelaborated, cryptic guidepost.” 
Young, supra note 21 at 185.
31. See e.g. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney General), 
2004 SCC 4 at para 91, [2004] 1 SCR 76; Gosselin (Tutor of ) v Quebec (Attorney General), 
2005 SCC 15 at para 15, [2005] 1 SCR 238 [Gosselin]; Kapp, supra note 6 at para 15; 
Withler, supra note 1 at paras 39, 41-42.
32. Sheila McIntyre, “Answering the Siren Call of Abstract Formalism with the Subjects and 
Verbs of Domination” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & Kate M Stephenson, eds, Making 
Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality Under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2006) 99 at 105.
33. Sheppard, supra note 20 at 39.
34. See Ernest J Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 9-15.
Weinrib elucidates a juridical conception of the normative ideal of corrective justice that 
underlies private law. For the Court’s acknowledgement of corrective justice, see Clements v 
Clements, 2012 SCC 32 at para 7, [2012] 2 SCR 181.
35. See generally Law, supra note 6 at paras 23-30, 40-44. Iacobucci J stated that Andrews 
“articulates many of the basic principles which continue to guide s. 15(1) analysis to the 
present day” (ibid at para 22).
36. Kapp, supra note 6 at para 14.
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the Court cited Justice McIntyre’s reasons to reject a formalistic approach to 
comparator groups under section 15(1)37 and to vindicate the assertion that 
substantive equality is an essential element of the legal test for discrimination.38 
Justice Abella and Justice LeBel each explicitly relied on Andrews in penning their 
divergent reasons in Quebec v A.39
As I will explain more fully below, the juridical conception of substantive 
equality I espouse in this article draws upon a distinction between (i) the vertical 
application of the law by the state to citizens’ activities and (ii) horizontal 
relations among citizens within society that make up the context within which 
the law’s vertical application is embedded.40 I construe the horizontal inequalities 
that obtain within citizens’ social relations by reference to patterns of what the 
American constitutional theorist Jack Balkin calls “status hierarchy.”41 Patterns 
of status hierarchy obtain not just when there are material disparities in wealth 
within society, but primarily when some social groups are perceived as having 
higher or lower degrees of symbolic prestige relative to others.42 Accompanying 
these hierarchies are structures of domination and oppression: Members of 
groups with lower status are subordinated to members of groups with higher 
status in that the identity associated with the former is defined as it is constructed 
by the latter. The cultural values of subordinate groups are hence labelled as 
deviant relative to the norm controlled by dominant groups. I claim that the 
wrong produced by status hierarchies consists in the negation of recognition for 
members of subordinate groups.43 That is, it consists in a denial of subordinate 
37. Withler, supra note 1 at para 42. For discussion and critique of the role of comparator groups 
in the Court’s s 15(1) jurisprudence, see e.g. Daphne Gilbert & Diana Majury, “Critical 
Comparisons: The Supreme Court of Canada Dooms Section 15” (2006) 24:1 Windsor 
YB Access Just 111; Sophia Reibetanz Moreau, “Equality Rights and the Relevance of 
Comparator Groups” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality 31.
38. Ibid at para 2.
39. For Abella J’s reliance on Andrews, see Quebec v A, supra note 7 at paras 319-25. For LeBel J’s 
reliance on Andrews, see Quebec v A, supra note 7 at paras 137, 142-45.
40. I adapt this distinction from a similar formulation made by Sophia Moreau. See Sophia 
R Moreau, “The Wrongs of Unequal Treatment” (2004) 54:3 UTLJ 291 at 317 [Moreau, 
“Wrongs of Unequal Treatment”].
41. JM Balkin, “The Constitution of Status” (1996) 106:8 Yale LJ 2313 at 2321.
42. While status hierarchies are often intertwined with economic inequalities in the distribution 
of material resources, such as wealth and property, economic and status inequalities are 
nevertheless analytically distinct. Nancy Fraser, “From Redistribution to Recognition? 
Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age” (1995) 1:212 New Left Rev 68 at 72-73. See 
also Balkin, supra note 41 at 2322.
43. See generally Fraser, supra note 42; Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in Amy 
Gutmann, ed, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994) 25.
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groups’ ability to view their own identities authentically and as worthy starting 
points from which to formulate and pursue a conception of the good life.
My thesis is that the state of affairs of substantive equality is a condition in 
which the law does not transmit horizontal status hierarchies, and the systems 
of oppression attached to them, through its vertical impact. In the terms of 
this article’s second epigraph, the purpose of section 15(1) is to ensure that the 
oppression constitutive of horizontal inequalities is not imbued with the force 
of law. Discrimination under section 15(1) of the Charter—the negation of 
recognition—occurs when this transmission occurs. I call the theory produced 
by conjoining these two claims Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition.44
As we shall see, Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition generates a unitary 
account of the wrong of discrimination that treats the negation of recognition 
44. The theory rests on the idea that discrimination is substantive inequality, or the denial of 
the norm of substantive equality. See e.g. Law, supra note 6 at para 84; Withler, supra note 
1 at para 35; Quebec v A, supra note 7 at paras 192, 201; Saskatchewan (Human Rights 
Commission) v Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11 at para 79, [2013] 1 SCR 467. I would not be the 
first to explain the purpose of s 15(1) by appealing to recognition theory or to the goal 
of combatting the legal transmission of social and cultural subordination. For authors 
that appeal to subordination, oppression, and domination, see e.g. Baines, supra note 29 
at 79; Young, supra note 21 at 195-96; McIntyre, supra note 32 at 103. See also Avigail 
Eisenberg, “Rights in the Age of Identity Politics” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 609. For 
an author who appeals to recognition theory, see Luc B Tremblay, “Promoting Equality and 
Combatting Discrimination Through Affirmative Action: The Same Challenge? Questioning 
the Canadian Substantive Equality Paradigm” (2012) 60:1 Am J Comp L 181. None of 
these authors, however, inquire into the relation between s 15(1) and subordination using 
recognition theory as comprehensively as I attempt to do. Tremblay is concerned not only 
with the purpose of s 15(1), but also with the relationship between this provision and s 15(2) 
of the Charter, which states: “Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity 
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups 
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” Appeals to status harms have, however, 
been comprehensively discussed in the American literature on the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the US Constitution. See Owen M Fiss, “Groups and the Equal Protection Clause” 
(1976) 5:2 Phil & Public Affairs 107; Jack M Balkin & Reva B Siegel, “The American Civil 
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?” (2003) 58:1 U Miami L Rev 9. 
My goal in this article can be understood as an attempt to conceptualize status harms in the 
context of Canadian constitutional law to the same degree of comprehensiveness as they have 
been conceptualized in the American context. Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten undertake 
deeper, philosophical explorations of the concept of recognition in relation to the ideal 
of equality and multiculturalism. See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal 
Theory of Minority Rights (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995); Alan Patten, 
Equal Recognition: The Moral Foundations of Minority Rights (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2014).
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as “explanatorily basic.”45 In this sense, it contrasts with pluralist theories of the 
wrong of discrimination, which posit multiple factors that make discrimination 
wrong, none of which are reducible to others.46 It also contrasts with unitary 
theories that posit factors other than the negation of recognition as the sole 
explanation for the wrong of discrimination, such as violations of human dignity 
or autonomy. To support my thesis, I argue that other factors that pluralist 
theories might posit to explain the wrong of discrimination are either reducible 
to the negation of recognition or implausible as they stand. I also criticize unitary 
theories based on human dignity and autonomy.
In Part II, I develop with greater precision the theory of Substantive Equality 
as Equal Recognition. In Part III, I argue that the theory can be abstracted 
from the foundational legal principles articulated in Andrews concerning the 
proper approach to analyzing equality claims. I concentrate especially on Justice 
McIntyre’s rejection of the formal equality paradigm in that case. The central 
line of thought in Part III incorporates novel explanations of what formal 
equality amounts to, what makes it unacceptable, and what it means to reject 
it, as these explanations emerge from the Andrews decision. In Part IV, I support 
the unitary account of the wrong of discrimination that Substantive Equality 
as Equal Recognition generates by arguing against pluralist accounts and other 
unitary accounts.
II. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY AS EQUAL RECOGNITION
Let us begin by exploring the theory of Substantive Equality as Equal 
Recognition. I have mentioned that the theory employs a distinction between 
the vertical application of the law by the state and horizontal social relations 
among citizens. The rationale for drawing this distinction is that it captures 
how we can think about the law’s application by the state in isolation from the 
social context in which the law applies, about social conditions in isolation from 
the law’s application, and, moreover, about the interaction between these two 
variables. To think about this interaction is to consider whether—and the degree 
to which—the law has the effect of mirroring the patterns of social relations that 
form when citizens congregate in a political community and shape their cultural 
identities through public life.
45. For use of this term see Moreau, “Wrongs of Unequal Treatment,” supra note 
40 at 314, n 44.
46. For an example of a pluralist theory, see ibid.
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Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition regards horizontal social relations 
as unequal because they are characterized by status hierarchies. Balkin argues that 
some social groups (groups organized around common lifestyles and cultural 
values) have more “approval, respect, admiration, or positive qualities” attached 
to them, while others are imputed with “corresponding disapproval and negative 
qualities.”47 The dominant groups in such relations oppress the subordinate 
groups in the sense that the “identity of one is defined in part by its relation-
ship to the identity of the other.”48 Such oppression consists in what Iris Marion 
Young refers to as “cultural imperialism.”49 Dominant groups’ cultural values 
and life styles are privileged over those of subordinate groups because dominant 
groups have primary access to social patterns of representation, interpretation, 
and communication.50 Their life experiences and values are expressed in the 
cultural conceptions of social prestige, honour, and moral approval51 that are the 
most widely disseminated in society and, as such, they are established as normal 
and unremarkable.52 Given the normality of its own identity, Young writes, “the 
dominant group constructs the differences which some groups exhibit as lack 
and negation. These groups become marked as Other.”53 In being marked as 
deviant in relation to the life styles of dominant groups, subordinate groups’ 
identities and cultural values are conceived as lacking in social prestige, honour, 
and moral approval.
In contemporary society, a status hierarchy exists, for example, between 
heterosexuals as the dominant group and homosexuals as the subordinate group.54 
Homosexuals’ ways of being are conceived as deviant relative to heterosexuals’ 
ways of being. Oppression in this relation takes the form of the construction 
of norms that privilege heterosexuality and devalue homosexuality.55 A status 
hierarchy also exists between men and women. Oppression between these 
groups involves the construction of norms that privilege masculinity and that 
promote what Nancy Fraser refers to as “subjection to androcentric norms in 
47. Balkin, supra note 41 at 2321.
48. Ibid at 2323.
49. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1990) at 59 [Young, Politics of Difference].
50. Fraser, supra note 42 at 71.
51. Balkin, supra note 41 at 2331.
52. Young, Politics of Difference, supra note 49 at 59.
53. Ibid.
54. Sexual orientation has been named an analogous ground of discrimination by the Court.  
See Egan, supra note 6.
55. Fraser, supra note 42 at 77.
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relation to which women appear lesser or deviant.”56 Finally, there is a racial status 
hierarchy between white people as the dominant group and people of colour as 
subordinate groups. Racism consists in the construction of norms that privilege 
traits associated with whiteness and the subjection of non-whites to Eurocentric 
norms relative to which other races appear deviant.57
The wrong suffered by members of subordinate social groups is a negation 
of recognition. The concept of recognition, as articulated in the work of Charles 
Taylor,58 is rooted in the ideal of authenticity. Authenticity means being true to 
oneself and living one’s life in accordance with one’s own particular viewpoint 
on what it is like to be-in-the-world: “Being true to myself means being true to 
my own originality, which is something only I can articulate and discover. In 
articulating it, I am also defining myself.”59 Taylor writes that we define ourselves 
“dialogically,” meaning that we formulate our own authentic identity through 
public intercourse with others.60 Our identity is our conception of “‘where 
we’re coming from’ … the background against which our tastes and desires and 
opinions and aspirations make sense.”61 Our authentic understanding of our 
identity as a worthy starting point from which to pursue a conception of the 
good depends on its recognition by others as similarly worthy simply due to its 
particularity to ourselves. It is disrupted when it is defined in juxtaposition to the 
identity and life style of others.
The life styles of subordinate social groups in status hierarchies are denied 
recognition because they are publicly conceived through precisely this sort of 
juxtaposition. The dialogical construction of subordinate groups’ identities is 
disrupted, and their members are unable to authentically conceptualize their way 
of being-in-the-world in positive terms.62 Axel Honneth remarks:
If [the] hierarchy of societal values is structured so as to downgrade individual forms 
of living and convictions for being inferior or deficient, then it robs the subjects in 
56. Ibid at 79.
57. Ibid at 81.
58. Taylor, supra note 43.
59. Ibid at 31.
60. Ibid at 32-34.
61. Ibid at 33-34.
62. This “identity model” has been the dominant way to understand the wrong of the negation 
of recognition in the literature. Fraser, who held this view initially, has criticized and moved 
away from it to develop a different view. See Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking Recognition” (2000) 
2:3 New Left Rev 107. An examination of the debate raised by Fraser’s work is beyond 
the scope of this article. For a summary of both Fraser’s views and arguments against her 
revisionist position, see Christopher F Zurn, “Identity or Status? Struggles over ‘Recognition’ 
in Fraser, Honneth, and Taylor” (2003) 10:4 Constellations 519.
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question of every opportunity to accord their abilities social value. Once confronted 
with an evaluation that downgrades certain patterns of self-realization, those who 
have opted for these patterns cannot relate to their mode of fulfillment as something 
invested with positive significance within their community. The individual who 
experiences this type of social devaluation typically falls prey to a loss of self-
esteem—that is, he is no longer in a position to conceive himself as a being whose 
characteristic traits and abilities are worthy of esteem.63
Since the negation of recognition consists in a failure to recognize the 
particularity of a group’s life style, instead defining the group as Other relative to 
established normalcy, remedying it requires promoting the differentiation of that 
group. The remedy takes the form of emphasizing the specificity of a social group 
and affirming the value of that specificity.64
According to Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition, substantive 
equality is a norm regulating the interaction between a law’s vertical application 
and horizontal social inequalities. It is instantiated if a law’s vertical effects do not 
transmit status hierarchies, that is, if the oppression of subordinate social groups 
by negative characterizations of their identity is not given the force of law.65 The 
state therefore uses a law to discriminate if the law’s vertical effects reproduce 
horizontal status hierarchies. Because the inequality constitutive of status 
hierarchies negates the recognition of subordinate groups’ authentic identities, 
the wrong of state-perpetrated discrimination can be described as the negation of 
the recognition of the authentic identities of citizens belonging to those groups.66
63. Axel Honneth, “Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on 
the Theory of Recognition” (1992) 20:2 Pol Theory 187 at 191-92.
64. Fraser, supra note 42 at 74.
65. This is similar to how US anti-subordination theorists contend that “guarantees of equal 
citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of pervasive social stratification” and argue 
that “law should reform institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social status of 
historically oppressed groups.” See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 44 at 9. Owen Fiss has also 
written that the constitutional protection of equality under the US Constitution’s Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that laws do not “impair or threaten or aggravate” the “subordinate 
position of a specially disadvantaged group.” Fiss, supra note 44 at 157.
66. For authors who also apply recognition theory to conceptualize the protection of equality 
under s 15(1) of the Charter, see Tremblay, supra note 44 at 190-91; Judy Fudge, “The 
Canadian Charter of Rights: Recognition, Redistribution, and the Imperialism of the 
Courts” in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing & Adam Tomkins, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 335 at 340-52. I have described the wrong of 
state-perpetrated discrimination as a wrong against individuals, but it is important to note 
that Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition entails that discrimination is also wrongful 
in relation to the public value of equality governing state-citizen interaction. According to 
one conception of this public value that is receiving widespread acceptance, for a state to 
be egalitarian is for it to oppose hierarchies of power, to abolish oppression, to repudiate 
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III. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY AS EQUAL RECOGNITION IN 
ANDREWS
Having articulated Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition more carefully, 
I now turn to discussing Andrews. In that case, the Court found that the Law 
Society of British Columbia’s requirement that lawyers be Canadian citizens 
was discriminatory. Justice McIntyre’s highly influential majority judgment on 
section 15(1) outlined four principles concerning the provision’s purpose and the 
proper method for analyzing equality claims.
Before proceeding to the discussion of Andrews, I note a caveat about my 
presentation of Justice McIntyre’s reasons in the case. Justice McIntyre engaged 
extensively with pre-Charter jurisprudence on the concepts of equality and 
discrimination. A conceptually rigorous understanding of what Justice McIntyre 
accomplished in the case (when he broke from the pre-Charter jurisprudence, 
and thereby set the stage for subsequent interpretations of section 15(1) of the 
Charter that so frequently cite Andrews), requires an appreciation of his reasons 
on their own terms. The ensuing discussion’s construction of the pre-Charter 
jurisprudence, while perhaps not providing an entirely accurate depiction 
outside of the context of Andrews, proceeds through the lens of Justice McIntyre’s 
own construction of that jurisprudence. In my view, it is necessary to treat the 
pre-Charter jurisprudence in such a manner to properly attend to the heritage of 
the constitutional equality guarantee in Canada and the principled foundations of 
the modern juridical conception of substantive equality laid down in Andrews.67
distinctions of moral worth based on social identity, and to create a social order in which 
citizens may live together in a democratic community, rather than a hierarchical one. This 
conception of equality has been called “democratic equality” by Elizabeth Anderson and 
the “social and political ideal of equality” by Samuel Scheffler. See Moreau, “Wrongs of 
Unequal Treatment,” supra note 40 at 292, n 4; Elizabeth S Anderson, “What is the Point of 
Equality?” (1999) 109:2 Ethics 287 at 312-15; Samuel Scheffler, “What is Egalitarianism?” 
(2003) 31:1 Phil & Public Affairs 5 at 21-24.
67. Readers may also find it objectionable that I leave out of my summation of the important 
principles articulated in Andrews the claim by McIntyre J that the “promotion of equality 
entails the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are 
recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.” 
Andrews, supra note 2 at para 34. It is true that this has been an influential claim. See 
especially Law, supra note 6 at para 51. I would construe it as a nascent claim about the state 
of affairs of substantive equality under s 15(1) that has not received concerted development 
(outside of the attempt by Iacobucci J in Law to define substantive equality in terms of 
human dignity, an attempt repudiated in Kapp). On my Substantive Equality as Equal 
Recognition view, I would explain the claim as reaching towards the account of substantive 
equality developed in this article wherein the law does not reflect through its vertical impact 
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A. FOUR PRINCIPLES FROM ANDREWS
The most important principle emerging from Andrews for the purposes of this 
argument is Justice McIntyre’s rejection of a formal equality approach to analyzing 
section 15(1) claims. Justice McLachlin of the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
(as she then was) recommended this approach at the time Andrews was litigated.68 
According to Justice McIntyre, the approach holds that “things that are alike 
should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in 
proportion to their unalikeness.”69 Thus, those who are similarly situated should 
be treated similarly.70
Justice McIntyre held that “mere equality of application to similarly situated 
groups or individuals does not afford a realistic test for a violation of equality 
rights.”71 Two reasons he gave for this holding were that a “similarly situated test” 
would justify the odious Nuremberg laws of Nazi Germany, which contemplated 
similar treatment for all Jews,72 and the notorious separate but equal treatment 
doctrine applied by the US Supreme Court in the Plessy v Ferguson.73
Additionally, prior the Charter’s introduction, formal equality and the 
similarly situated test informed Canadian courts’ interpretations of section 1(a) 
of the Canadian Bill of Rights.74 These concepts were relied on by the British 
horizontal social inequalities. Indeed, it could be explained as an account of the wrong of 
discrimination in terms of the public value of equality with which Substantive Equality as 
Equal Recognition accords. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
68. See Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia (1986), 27 DLR (4th) 600 at para 16, 2 
BCLR (2d) 305 (CA).
69. Andrews, supra note 2 at para 27. McIntyre J notes that the McLachlin J, writing in the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, derived the formal equality principle from an influential 
article written by the American scholars Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek. See “The 
Equal Protection of the Laws” (1979) 37:3 Cal L Rev 341. It is interesting to note that 
Tussman and tenBroek referred to the substantive equal protection principle in their article, 
but concluded that the US Supreme Court had never adopted it (ibid at 346). See also 
Baines, supra note 29 at 79.
70. Young, supra note 21 at 191; Sheppard, supra note 20 at 40.
71. Andrews, supra note 2 at para 28.
72. Ibid at para 28.
73. Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537, 16 S Ct 1138 (1896) [Plessy].
74. RSC 1970, c 44 [Bill of Rights]. Section 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights provides:
It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to 
exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the 
following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely … the right of the individual to 
equality before the law and the protection of the law.
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Columbia Court of Appeal in R v Gonzales,75 which decided that the provision of 
the Indian Act making it a criminal offence for Aboriginals to possess intoxicants 
off reserve was not discriminatory. In The Queen v Drybones, which involved 
a similar Indian Act prohibition making it an offence for an Aboriginal to be 
intoxicated off reserve, the Supreme Court of Canada criticized the approach in 
Gonzales. Justice Ritchie, in a dictum endorsed by Justice McIntyre in Andrews, 
stated that formal equality is iniquitous because it would permit discriminatory 
legislation as long as all those to whom the legislation applies are discriminated 
against in the same way.76
Justice McIntyre also stated that the Court applied a similarly situated test in 
the pre-Charter cases of Bliss v Canada (Attorney General)77 and Attorney General 
of Canada v Lavell.78 The claimant in Bliss, a pregnant woman, argued that 
unemployment insurance legislation discriminated against her on the basis of sex 
by denying her benefits to which she would have been entitled had she not been 
pregnant. The Court rejected her claim because the class into which she fell under 
the legislation was that of pregnant persons, and, within that class, all persons 
were treated equally.79 Formal equality also justified the Lavell decision, wherein 
the Court held that a statute depriving women, but not men, of membership in 
Aboriginal groups if they married non-Aboriginals was not discriminatory.
Justice McIntyre held that these adherences to formal equality produced 
unacceptable outcomes for equality claimants. He maintained that while 
section 15(1) of the Charter is concerned with a law’s application, “a bad law 
will not be saved merely because it operates equally upon those to whom it has 
application.”80 Rather, consideration must be given to a law’s impact upon those 
to whom it applies and those it excludes from its application. In contrast with the 
formalistic similarly situated test, the proper approach to determining whether a 
law is discriminatory under section 15(1) must be contextual and consider a law’s 
effects.81 The paradigm of substantive equality thus grew out of this rejection of 
formal equality in Andrews.
The second legal principle articulated in Andrews is that section 15(1) 
prevents adverse effects discrimination, which occurs where a law that does not 
75. (1962), 32 DLR (2d) 290, 37 CR 56 (BC CA) [Gonzales cited to DLR].
76. The Queen v Drybones, [1970] SCR 282 at para 40, 9 DLR (3d) 473 [Drybones].
77. [1979] 1 SCR 183, 92 DLR (3d) 417 [Bliss cited to SCR].
78. [1974] SCR 1349, 38 DLR (3d) 481 [Lavell cited to SCR].
79. Andrews, supra note 2 at para 29.
80. Ibid at para 28.
81. Ibid at para 30.
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create a distinction on its face (i.e., is facially neutral) discriminates in its effects.82 
Justice McIntyre acknowledged that discrimination under the Charter need not 
be intentional but could be the unintentional by-product of innocently motivated 
rules or standards.83 The third principle is that equality under the Charter is a 
comparative concept. Equality requires courts to compare the conditions of 
various groups in the social context in which an equality claim arises.84
The final principle is that not every legislative distinction infringes section 
15(1). The state must be allowed to treat different groups of citizens in different 
ways in order to govern effectively: “The classifying of individuals and groups, 
the making of different provisions respecting such groups, and the application 
of different rules, regulations and qualifications to different persons is necessary 
for the governance of modern society.”85 Indeed, laws will often have to make 
distinctions for the state to accommodate differences among citizens and to 
ameliorate the positions of disadvantaged groups through affirmative action.86 
Hence, Justice McIntyre rejected the suggestion offered by Professor Peter Hogg 
that every distinction made by a law constitutes discrimination.87 He instead 
held that a distinction infringes section 15(1) only if it is based on enumerated or 
analogous grounds88 and has a discriminatory impact.89
I argue that Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition is latent in these four 
legal principles articulated in Andrews. My focus is predominantly on Justice 
McIntyre’s rejection of formal equality. I contend that once we understand 
precisely what formal equality amounts to and what makes it unacceptable, we are 
82. See Eldridge, supra note 22 at paras 60-61.
83. Andrews, supra note 2 at para 37, citing Canadian National Railway Co v Canada (Canadian 
Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 SCR 1114 at 1139, 40 DLR (4th) 193. See also 
O’Malley v Simpsons-Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536 at 551, 23 DLR (4th) 321. In an 
oft-quoted passage, Justice McIntyre wrote:
[D]iscrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on 
grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect 
of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed 
upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages 
available to other members of society.
 Andrews, supra note 2 at para 37.
84. Ibid at para 26.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid. See also McIntyre, supra note 32 at 100.
87. Andrews, supra note 2 at para 44.
88. Ibid at para 43.
89. Ibid at para 46.
SANGIULIANO, SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 619
compelled to embrace Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition as an attractive 
juridical conception of substantive equality under section 15(1) of the Charter.
B. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY AS EQUAL RECOGNITION IS DISCLOSED BY 
THE FOUR ANDREWS PRINCIPLES
1. THE IDEA OF FORMAL EQUALITY
What does formal equality amount to? I claim that it attends only to equality in 
the law’s vertical application by the state to citizens independently of the law’s 
effects. As Justice McIntyre noted in Andrews, state governance consists in using 
laws to classify general categories of citizens in society and to carve them out for 
certain kinds of treatment different from the treatment given to those excluded 
from the categorization.90 Citizens caught within these categories are deemed to 
be similarly situated. Formal equality requires only that the vertical application 
of a law must affect equally each member of a group carved out by a legislative 
classification. Thus, those similarly situated must be treated similarly.
Formal equality in pre-Charter interpretation of the Bill of Rights grew out of 
a Diceyan view of the rule of law, which requires “the equal subjection of all classes 
to the ordinary law of the land.”91 Justice Rand famously expressed this view 
in Roncarelli v Duplessis.92 In that case, Quebec Premier Maurice Duplessis had 
revoked Frank Roncarelli’s liquor licence for posting bail for a group of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. The statute pursuant to which he acted allowed him to revoke licences 
at his discretion. Justice Rand wrote that, as regards public officials, “there is no 
such thing as absolute and untrammelled ‘discretion,’ that is that action can be 
taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the 
administrator.”93 For Justice Rand, the law as a totality must apply equally to 
all members of society, regardless of whether they hold public office.94 Premier 
Duplessis’s conduct offended the rule of law because he exempted himself as 
a public official from the law’s application through an exercise of discretion 
90. For a philosophical discussion of this matter, see WJ Waluchow, A Common Law Theory of 
Judicial Review: The Living Tree (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 194-97.
91. Walter S Tarnopolsky, “The Equality Rights (Ss. 15, 27 and 28)” in Walter S Tarnopolsky & 
Gérald A Beaudoin, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Commentary (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1982) 395 at 399, citing AV Dicey, Introduction to the Law of the Constitution, 10th 
ed, ed by ECS Wade (London, UK: Macmillan, 1961) at 202-203.
92. [1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689.
93. Ibid at para 41.
94. Tarnopolsky, supra note 91 at 400.
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unrestrained by law.95 Dicey’s view of the rule of law was also adopted in Lavell 
by Justice Ritchie, who wrote that “‘equality before the law’ as recognized by 
Dicey as a segment of the rule of law, carries the meaning of equal subjection of 
all classes to the ordinary law of the land.”96
Formal equality, or the similarly situated test, amounts to a microcosmic 
version of Dicey’s view of the rule of law. Dicey’s view is that the law in toto 
must apply equally to all citizens in society, regardless of whether they wield 
public power. Formal equality holds that a particular law must apply equally to 
all citizens carved out and classified into a particular category by the law.
We can find this understanding of formal equality in Gonzales. Justice Tysoe 
wrote that there exists in Canada “a right in every person to whom a particular 
law relates or extends … to stand on an equal footing with every other person to 
whom that particular law relates or extends.”97 He reasoned that the prohibition 
against Aboriginals possessing intoxicants off reserve was not racially discrimi-
natory because every Aboriginal person to whom the law creating the offence 
extended was equally subject to the offence.
Although Justice Ritchie putatively rejected this reasoning in Drybones, his 
decision in Drybones was still influenced by the similarly situated test. He held 
that the Bill of Rights required that all laws enacted by the federal government 
be applied equally to all those to whom they extend.98 The combination of the 
federally-enacted Indian Act, which prohibited Aboriginals from being intoxicated 
off reserve, and the federally-enacted Criminal Code, which contained no similar 
prohibition for non-Aboriginals, entailed that federal laws in toto did not apply 
equally to all those to whom they extend. In other words, an expansive construc-
tion of the category of citizens demarcated by federal law, which contemplated 
all Canadian citizens subject to the Criminal Code and, within that category, 
Aboriginals subject to the Indian Act, meant that those who were similarly 
situated under federal law as a totality were not treated similarly.99 Justice Ritchie 
therefore held that the prohibition in Drybones was discriminatory.100
95. This view of the rule of law was affirmed more recently in the Secession Reference, where 
the Court claimed that “the law is supreme over the acts of both government and private 
persons.” See Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 71, 161 DLR (4th) 385.
96. Lavell, supra note 78 at 1366.
97. Gonzales, supra note 75 at para 23 [emphasis in original].
98. Drybones, supra note 76 at 297.
99. This was essentially how Ritchie J understood Drybones when referring to it in Lavell. Lavell, 
supra note 78 at 1372.
100. Ritchie J stated that a person is denied equality “if it is made an offence punishable at law, 
on account of his race, for him to do something which his fellow Canadians are free to do 
without having committed any offence.” Drybones, supra note 76 at 297.
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This covert acceptance of formal equality in Drybones might explain why its 
connection with the rule of law was implicitly reinforced in Bliss and Lavell. In 
Bliss, Justice Ritchie defined equality as the equal administration and enforcement 
of the law.101 He also accepted the Federal Court of Appeal’s definition of the right 
to equality as “the right of an individual to be treated as well by the legislation as 
others who … would be judged to be in the same situation.”102 In finding that 
the law in the instant case, which denied unemployment insurance to pregnant 
women, did not discriminate against women, he agreed with the Court of Appeal 
that the law did not treat unequally those to whom it applied. Those similarly 
situated under the law (both men and women) were treated similarly; those 
excluded from the law’s classification (all pregnant persons) were equally denied 
insurance benefits.103
In Lavell, Justice Ritchie explicitly connected equality under the Bill of Rights 
to the rule of law, stating that equality is “frequently invoked to demonstrate that 
the same law applies to the highest official of government as to any other ordinary 
citizen.”104 He found that the law requiring Aboriginal women to forfeit their 
Aboriginal status if they married a non-Aboriginal was not racially discriminatory. 
When combined with other federal laws, it did not treat Aboriginals differently 
from those situated similarly to them. It concerned “the internal regulation of the 
lives of Indians on Reserves,”105 while other federal laws governed the Canadian 
citizenry generally. The claimant, who was subject to the impugned law when 
she was on reserve, was situated differently from non-Aboriginal Canadians, who 
were not subject to the law. Thus, she did not fall into the same legal category as 
non-Aboriginals, and it was not necessary that she be treated similarly to them 
under the federal laws applicable within that category. The claimant in Lavell was 
therefore distinguishable from the claimant in Drybones. Recall that in Drybones 
the claimant, when off reserve, was subject to the same federal laws governing 
the Canadian citizenry generally, including the Criminal Code, and fell into the 
same legal category as non-Aboriginals. Once he became similarly situated with 
non-Aboriginals in this way, it became necessary that he be treated similarly to 
them by the criminal prohibitions contained in the Indian Act.106
101. Bliss, supra note 77 at 192.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid at 190-91. This is also McIntyre J’s interpretation of Bliss in Andrews. Andrews, supra 
note 2 at para 29.
104. Lavell, supra note 78 at 1366.
105. Ibid at 1367.
106. See ibid at 1372.
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Lastly, the US Supreme Court in the objectionable Plessy case also drew 
upon a construction of formal equality in terms of a Diceyean view of the rule 
of law. Plessy upheld a law requiring railway companies to provide separate but 
equal accommodations for white and black persons. Justice Brown stated that 
a law does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equality unless it confers 
on public authorities “arbitrary power,” such as the power to give or withhold 
licences “at their own will, and without regard to discretion, in the legal sense, 
of the term.”107 He held that the impugned statute was not unreasonable on this 
standard.108 This line of thought parallels that of Justice Rand in Roncarelli in that 
it contains vestiges of the account of the rule of law developed in that case.
2. WHAT MAKES FORMAL EQUALITY UNACCEPTABLE?
What is it then that makes formal equality unacceptable? To be sure, a construc-
tion of formal equality in terms of a Diceyean view of the rule of law may be 
essential to promoting the ideal of equality, as it appeared to be in Roncarelli.109 
However, borrowing from the writing of Sheila McIntyre, I claim that the 
formal equality paradigm frequently involves the “application of the law with 
one’s eyes shut.”110 In attending only to equality in the law’s application by the 
state, rather than the social context in which the law’s application takes place, 
the paradigm ignores how similar treatment of those similarly situated under a 
law can reflect, through the law’s vertical effects, horizontal inequalities among 
citizens in society. For example, the equal vertical application of the Nuremberg 
laws to all those they carved out for similar abhorrent treatment transmitted the 
subordinate status of Jewish identity and culture that existed horizontally within 
Nazi Germany society.
In Gonzales and Lavell, the law’s vertical application transmitted the horizontal 
status hierarchy existing between subordinate Aboriginals and dominant 
non-Aboriginals. In denying Aboriginals the ability to possess intoxicants off 
reserve, the law in Gonzales in effect treated Aboriginals as unworthy of doing 
what non-Aboriginals were able to do with widespread public social approval, 
implying that the Aboriginal life style was deficient relative to that of non-Aborig-
inals. The law in Lavell produced an outcome that deprived Aboriginal women 
of their cultural identification. In requiring Aboriginal women to forfeit their 
107. Plessy, supra note 73 at 550.
108. Ibid.
109. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to acknowledge this point. For 
further discussion, see Moreau, “Wrongs of Unequal Treatment,” supra note 40 at 302, n 26.
110. McIntyre, supra note 32 at 103.
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Aboriginal status if they married non-Aboriginals, it gave the force of law to the 
subordination of both Aboriginal identity to non-Aboriginal identity and female 
identity to male identity.111 It therefore reflected the oppression that characterizes 
the horizontal status hierarchies between these groups by transmitting an image 
of Aboriginal culture and femininity as Other relative to non-Aboriginal culture 
and masculinity, respectively. Finally, in denying insurance benefits to pregnant 
women, the law in Bliss failed to respect women’s particular way of being-in-the-
world, mirroring how women’s values and ways of being are subordinated by 
being defined as deviant relative to the values and ways of being of men. This is 
all true despite how the law in these cases applied equally to subordinated social 
groups by treating similarly all those it classified for similar treatment.
It is also instructive to observe that in Plessy, unlike in the pre-Charter 
equality cases, Justice Brown examined the interaction between the law’s vertical 
application and the horizontal status hierarchy in American society whereby 
blacks are subordinated by whites. However, he found that the former did not 
transmit the latter. He rejected the argument that “the enforced separation of the 
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority” even though he 
implicitly recognized that blacks are in an “inferior position” while whites hold 
a position of “dominant power.”112 Justice Harlan, who dissented, argued that 
the statute was discriminatory because its vertical impact reflected the American 
black-white status hierarchy. He wrote:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in 
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power … But in view of the 
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, 
ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.113
Thus, Justice Harlan denounced the separate but equal doctrine associated 
with formal equality for failing to attend to the social context in which a law applies.
111. This statement draws upon the idea that discrimination can occur on the basis of the 
multiple, intersecting grounds of race and sex. For further discussion of this concept of 
intersectionality, see Dianne Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real 
People’s Real Experiences” (2001) 13:1 CJWL 37; Denise G Réaume, “Of Pidgeonholes and 
Principles: A Reconsideration of Discrimination Law” (2002) 40:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 113; 
Nita Iyer, “Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity” in David 
Dyzenhaus, Sophia Reibetanz Moreau & Arthur Ripstein, eds, Law and Morality: Readings in 
Legal Philosophy, 3d ed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 480.
112. Plessy, supra note 73 at 551.
113. Ibid at 559.
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Putting all this together, a conception of formal equality rooted in Dicey’s 
view of the rule of law unacceptably ignores the transmission of horizontal status 
hierarchies through a law’s equal vertical application to all those it classifies 
for similar treatment. Hence, Justice McIntyre’s rejection of formal equality in 
Andrews in favour of a substantive equality approach to section 15(1) of the 
Charter laid down the principle that a law is discriminatory when it reflects, 
through its vertical impact, horizontal status hierarchies in society. This is, I 
submit, the exact claim made by Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition.
This submission is capable of further support. Consider that a common 
admonition of the formal equality paradigm is that its recommendation of rigid 
proceduralism when analyzing equality claims fails to consider the substantive 
social outcomes of a law’s formal application.114 The state of affairs of formal 
equality (wherein those similarly situated are treated similarly) tends to be 
realized by a methodology that privileges the decontexualized application of rules 
to facts. I have claimed that formal equality rests on a Diceyan view of the rule 
of law. Notice that the Supreme Court of Canada has invoked such a view when 
developing the rules of procedural fairness in constitutional and administrative 
law.115 This affinity between the doctrine of procedural fairness in public law and 
the Diceyan view of the rule of law explains why formal equality has a distinctive 
yet unacceptable procedural nature.
Additionally, some Supreme Court of Canada decisions since Andrews have 
closely approximated Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition. In Vriend v 
Alberta, the Court held that Alberta’s human rights legislation infringed section 
15(1) by not including sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimina-
tion.116 Justice Cory indicated how the effects of the legislative omission reflected 
the subordinate status of homosexuals and depicted their identity as less worthy 
of approval relative to that of heterosexuals: “Fear of discrimination will logically 
lead to concealment of true identity and this must be harmful to personal 
confidence and self-esteem. Compounding that effect is the implicit message 
conveyed by the exclusion, that gays and lesbians, unlike other individuals, are 
not worthy of protection.”117 In M v H, the Court held that Ontario’s Family 
Law Act was discriminatory because it excluded same-sex couples from its spousal 
114. See e.g. Sheppard, supra note 20 at 39; McIntyre, supra note 32 at 105.
115. See e.g. Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at 
para 53, 174 DLR (4th) 193. See also David Dyzenhaus, “Constituting the Rule of Law: 
Fundamental Values in Administrative Law” (2002) 27:2 Queen’s LJ 445 at 447-48.
116. Judy Fudge also explains the Vriend decision in terms of recognition theory. See Fudge, supra 
note 66 at 341.
117. Vriend, supra note 22 at para 102.
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support provisions. The exclusion promoted the view that individuals in same-sex 
relationships are “less worthy of recognition and protection” and “incapable of 
forming intimate relationships of economic interdependence as compared to 
opposite-sex couples.”118 The congruency of these dicta with Substantive Equality 
as Equal Recognition supports the theory’s viability as a juridical conception of 
substantive equality under the Charter.
Finally, one clear ambition of Canadian constitutional equality jurisprudence 
since Andrews has been to repudiate the separate but equal treatment doctrine 
of Plessy. It is therefore important to appreciate how the US Supreme Court 
itself repudiated that doctrine in Brown v Board of Education of Topeka.119 Chief 
Justice Warren’s judgment in that case closely approximated Substantive Equality 
as Equal Recognition by holding that “it is wrong for the state to engage in 
practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups.”120 
Brown struck down laws in four US states that required segregation of black 
and white children in public schools because the laws were racially discrimina-
tory contrary to the US Constitution’s equality guarantee. Chief Justice Warren 
stated that separating black children from others of similar age and qualifica-
tions solely because of their race “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone.”121 Echoing the judgement of Justice Harlan in Plessy, this 
statement expresses the view that the impugned laws were discriminatory because 
their vertical application reflected the black-white status hierarchy in American 
society. They did this by giving the force of law to the subordinate status of 
black persons and to the oppressive characterization of their identity and worth 
as inferior relative to white persons’ identity and worth.
The rationale animating Brown’s rejection of the separate but equal treatment 
doctrine was carried forward in the 1967 case of Loving v Virginia,122 in which 
the US Supreme Court invalidated a law prohibiting interracial marriage because 
it enforced a racial status hierarchy.123 Chief Justice Warren wrote that there 
was no purpose other than “invidious racial discrimination” which justified 
the impugned law: “The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages 
involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on 
118. M v H, [1999] 2 SCR 3 at para 73, 171 DLR (4th) 577.
119. 347 US 483, 74 S Ct 686 (1954) [Brown cited to US].
120. Reva B Siegel, “Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles over Brown” (2004) 117:5 Harv L Rev 1470 at 1472-73, 1484-89.
121. Brown, supra note 119 at 494.
122. 388 US 1, 87 S Ct 1817 (1967) [Loving cited to US].
123. Siegel, supra note 120 at 1503.
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their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”124 
In carrying Brown’s reasoning forward in this way, the US Supreme Court again 
closely approximated Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition.
3. OTHER PRINCIPLES FROM ANDREWS
Before concluding Part III, and for the sake of completeness, I will briefly show 
how Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition is also disclosed by the other three 
legal principles articulated in Andrews. Doing so is necessary to fully demonstrate 
the credentials of the theory as a juridical conception of substantive equality.
 First, Justice McIntyre’s acknowledgment of adverse effects discrimination 
in Andrews supports the theory by demonstrating that a statute could reflect 
horizontal status hierarchies through its vertical outcomes even if the legislature 
does not intend to do so or if the law is facially neutral. In fact, this was precisely 
the situation in Vriend v Alberta, where a legislative omission in Alberta’s human 
rights legislation reflected the subordinate status of homosexual persons.
Second, Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition mandates a comparative 
approach to analyzing equality claims under section 15(1). That is, determining 
whether a law transmits status hierarchies requires examining the relations of 
oppression and subordination that constitute such hierarchies. The theory 
is thus consistent with academic endorsement of the comparative nature of 
substantive equality. Beverley Baines’s remarks provide a fine example of this 
endorsement. She writes:
the main task of this principle is not classification of harms, but comparison of those 
who are harmed with those who harm. In effect, the substantive equality principle 
exposes the relations of power between those who are privileged and those who are not, 
between oppressors and the oppressed, and between dominance and subordination.125
In mandating a comparative approach to equality claims in this fashion, 
Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition presupposes a relational conception of 
124. Loving, supra note 122 at 11.
125. Baines, supra note 29 at 81. See also McIntyre, supra note 32 at 103; Young, supra 
note 21 at 197-98.
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the self.126 This is because, given its incorporation of the concept of recognition, it 
holds that a person’s authentic identity is constructed in comparison with social 
groups other than her own. It is worth noting that this presupposition gives the 
theory added ammunition against the formal equality paradigm, as the Diceyan 
view of the rule of law on which formal equality rests presupposes an individual-
istic conception of the self. An individualistic conception of the self sees personal 
identity as a product of rational free choice unencumbered by relations with 
others and political liberty as organized around the need to preserve individual 
autonomy.127 By insisting on the equal formal application of the law to those 
similarly situated, the Diceyan view of the rule of law regards the conferral of 
untrammelled discretion on public officials as unjustifiably subjecting citizens 
to arbitrary coercion by the state. That is, official discretion undermines citizens’ 
expectations about the limits of the state’s ability to interfere with their liberty 
and about the parameters within which they may make choices and pursue their 
life plans free from such interference.128 According to D.J. Galligan’s description:
Coercion of this kind is a deprivation of liberty in a special and negative sense; 
that is, the liberty that results from having a sphere of activity protected by rules, 
and within which officials may not interfere except in accordance with the rules. ... 
Where power is exercised according to known and general rules, the individual is 
able to live within those roles, and will be coerced only if by his own choice he puts 
himself in violation. In such a situation he is free in so far as there are parameters 
within which he must live, and within those parameters he may make choices, and 
he is free from official interference in doing so. Conversely, where officials are given 
powers which may be exercised in ways which interfere with the individual and his 
private interests, and where it is left to officials to decide in their discretion under 
126. For discussion of the relational conception of the self, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: 
A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) ch 1; 
John Christman, “Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution 
of Selves” (2004) 117:1-2 Phil Stud 143 at 144-56. Richard Moon explicitly ties a relational 
theory of the self into the protection of equality under s 15(1) of the Charter in the context 
of discussing the constitutional protection of freedom of expression in Canada. See Richard 
Moon, “Accommodation without Compromise: Comment on Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of 
Wilson Colony” (2010) 51 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 96 at 113.
127. See Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, “Introduction: Autonomy Refigured” in Catriona 
Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, eds, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, 
Agency, and the Social Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 3 at 4-5.
128. See the discussion in Gus Van Harten, Gerald Heckman & David J Mullan, Administrative 
Law: Cases, Text, and Materials, 6th ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2010) at 951-57.
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what circumstances and in what ways interference may occur, then the individual is 
threatened with a form of coercion that infringes his liberty.129
The problem for formal equality is that the Supreme Court of Canada has 
eschewed reliance on an individualistic conception of the self to resolve consti-
tutional challenges.130 Most importantly, it did so in Quebec v A.131 In that case, 
Justice Abella explicitly adopted the relational conception of the self, individual 
choice, and autonomy defended by such theorists as Margot Young.132 I shall 
return to the notions of choice and autonomy below.
Third, Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition allows that not every 
legislative distinction is discriminatory under the Charter. According to the theory, 
subordinate groups are disadvantaged in that the particularity of their identity 
is obscured by being defined as deviant relative to the identities of dominant 
groups. The remedy for this disadvantage is a measure that emphasizes the group’s 
differentiation and specificity rather than its juxtaposition with other groups. In 
this sense, the remedial measure is ameliorative. It is therefore consistent with 
the assertion that it is permissible for the state to create some non-discriminatory 
distinctions among citizens.133
129. DJ Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Oxford, UK: 
Clarendon Press, 1990) at 202-203.
130. Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at paras 85-92, [2013] 3 SCR 
1101 [Bedford].
131. Quebec v A, supra note 7 at paras 336, 338-347, Abella J.
132. Ibid at para 342; Young, supra note 21 at 193-94.
133. For these reasons, Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition could potentially 
ground a theory of ameliorative programs under s 15(2) of the Charter. The Court has 
stated that s 15(2)
is aimed at permitting governments to  improve  the situation of members of disadvantaged 
groups that have suffered discrimination in the past, in order to enhance substantive equality. It 
does this by affirming the validity of ameliorative programs that target particular disadvantaged 
groups, which might otherwise run afoul of s. 15(1) by excluding other groups. It is unavoidable 
that ameliorative programs, in seeking to help one group, necessarily exclude others.
 Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham, 2011 SCC 37 at para 
40, 2 SCR 670 [emphasis in original]. For recent insightful academic discussion of s 15(2), 
see Tremblay, supra note 44; Jonnette Watson Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan, “Courting 
Confusion? Three Recent Alberta Cases on Equality Rights Post-Kapp” (2010) 47:4 Alta L 
Rev 927; Jena McGill, “Section 15(2), Ameliorative Programs and Proportionality Review” 
(2013) 63 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 521.
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IV. DISCRIMINATION AS THE NEGATION OF RECOGNITION: 
RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS
I now respond to objections to Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition’s 
account of the wrong of discrimination, i.e., discrimination as the negation of 
recognition. As explained above, on this account the wrong of discrimination 
consists in the disruption of individuals’ dialogical construction of their identity, a 
disruption that is brought about by their identities’ negative juxtaposition as Other 
relative to those of dominant social groups. This juxtaposition obscures oppressed 
groups’ authentic self-conceptualization of their own particular life styles.
The two kinds of objections that this account must confront are posed by 
pluralist theories and competing unitary theories of the wrong of discrimination. 
I will first discuss pluralist theories.
A. RESPONSES TO PLURALISM
The account of discrimination that appeals to the negation of recognition 
posits exactly one factor that makes discrimination wrong. It thus invites the 
objection that many factors make discrimination wrong, with no one factor 
being reducible to another. Sophia Moreau argues in favour of such a pluralist 
view of discrimination.134 On her argument, stereotyping, prejudice, the denial 
of access to basic goods, and the perpetuation of oppressive power relations are 
all explanations of the wrong of discrimination that “are not reducible to a single, 
unifying explanation.”135
The factor of the perpetuation of oppressive power relations is similar to the 
account of the wrong of discrimination as the negation of recognition produced 
by status hierarchies. Therefore, to defend the account from pluralist objections, 
I will focus on the other three factors articulated by Moreau—stereotyping, 
prejudice, and the denial of access to basic goods.
1. STEREOTYPING IS REDUCIBLE TO THE NEGATION OF RECOGNITION
Moreau describes stereotyping as a generalized depiction of a social group that 
is treated by another group as capturing an essential feature of individuals 
134. Moreau, “Wrongs of Unequal Treatment,” supra note 40 at 294.
135. Ibid. Moreau also seems to suggest that the diminishment of individuals’ feelings of 
self-worth is also a sui generis wrong of discrimination. However, she states that “this way 
of understanding the wrong of unequal treatment cannot stand on its own as a complete 
explanation of why certain forms of differential treatment are unacceptable” (ibid at 313). 
For this reason, I do not include it in my discussion of pluralism in this article.
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belonging to the first group. Stereotypes are wrong because they “have been 
adopted by one group as a description of other individuals, rather than derived 
from these individuals’ own attempts at self-definition.”136 Rather than being 
allowed to present her identity as she conceptualizes it, the stereotyped individual 
is presented in a manner of another’s choosing.137
I contend that the plight of the stereotyped individual on Moreau’s description 
is identical to that of members of subordinate groups in status hierarchies posited 
by Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition. The cultural values and life styles 
of subordinate groups in status hierarchies are characterized in a manner of 
another’s choosing; they are defined as deviant relative to the cultural values and 
life styles of dominant groups. In this sense, the identities of subordinate groups’ 
members are conceived of as juxtaposed to the identities of dominant groups, 
rather than as authentically self-defined through their dialogical recognition by 
others living in their social community. Indeed, Iris Marion Young explicitly 
appeals to stereotyping to articulate the phenomenon of cultural imperialism 
that Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition draws upon: “As remarkable, 
deviant beings, the culturally imperialized as stamped with an essence ... These 
stereotypes so permeate the society that they are not noticed as contestable.”138
Hence, stereotypes permeate the structures of oppression found within 
status hierarchies. Because discrimination produced by a law that reflects status 
hierarchies is wrongful because it negates individuals’ recognition, the wrong of 
stereotyping is reducible to the wrong of the negation of recognition.
2. PREJUDICE IS REDUCIBLE TO THE NEGATION OF RECOGNITION
For Moreau, prejudice is a belief in the inferiority of another that “involves a 
malicious desire to ... cause harm to him.”139 When perpetrated by the state, it 
involves the active setting out by the government to harm citizens. The wrong of 
prejudice thus amounts to an abuse of government power.140
An intuitively plausible story can be told about how prejudice, understood in 
terms of attitudes of animus or contempt towards an individual, is an outgrowth 
136. Ibid at 298.
137. Ibid at 299.
138. Young, Politics of Difference, supra note 49 at 59.
139. Moreau, “Wrongs of Unequal Treatment,” supra note 40 at 302. For a similar view of 
prejudice, see Denise Réaume, “Dignity and Discrimination” (2003) 63:3 Louisiana L Rev 
646 at 679. Réaume, however, argues that the wrong of prejudice is explicable in terms of the 
way it attacks others’ human dignity. I address her views in Part III(B)(1), below. LeBel J cites 
her definition of prejudice in Quebec v A. Supra note 7 at para 195.
140. Moreau, “Wrongs of Unequal Treatment,” supra note 40 at 302-303.
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of horizontal status hierarchies. Status hierarchies involve the negative character-
ization of the life styles of subordinate groups as deficient, inferior, and unworthy 
of moral approval. This manner of oppression by dominant groups can become 
compounded and magnified through time as it becomes further entrenched 
and invisible. It can thereby transform beyond mere belief in the inferiority 
of subordinate groups relative to established social norms into an active desire 
to harm members of subordinate groups simply because they are conceived as 
deviant or Other.
In this way, the negation of recognition produced by status hierarchies can 
legitimize in the minds of dominant groups acts of violence towards subordinate 
groups. Such violence is systemic in nature: “it is directed at members of a group 
simply because they are members of that group.”141 The systemic legitimation of 
violence leaves members of subordinate groups in a further state of oppression. This 
further oppression takes the form of a constant threat of harm that subordinate 
groups may face because, due to their group membership, they are constantly liable 
to be harmed without concomitant social and moral disapproval. For example, 
systemic animus towards women can leave them persistently liable to acts of rape, 
harassment, or attack that are publicly conceived as normal or acceptable.
According to Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition, if a law transmits 
status hierarchies it is discriminatory in that it negates the recognition of the 
authentic identities of subordinate groups. The law thus potentially transmits 
the systemic violence that can accompany status hierarchies. If it does so, it 
amounts to state action that transmits the animus held by dominant groups 
towards subordinate groups. It then constitutes an abuse of state power. Since 
these features of the law describe its prejudicial quality on Moreau’s view, her 
account of the wrong of prejudice is reducible to the wrong of the negation 
of recognition.
3. THE DENIAL OF ACCESS TO BASIC GOODS DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE 
WRONG OF DISCRIMINATION
A third factor that makes discrimination wrong on Moreau’s view is that it denies 
citizens access to basic goods. These goods are deemed to be important because 
of their contribution to an individual’s wellbeing, or because having them is a 
141. Young, Politics of Difference, supra note 49 at 62-63.
(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL632
necessary condition to function as an equal in society.142 Moreau writes that “if 
the government wishes to legislate over a certain matter and to provide certain 
benefits, it must do so in a way that does not leave the most disadvantaged groups 
in our society without access to the relevant basic goods.”143 Hence, for Moreau 
the wrong of discrimination has a redistributive dimension beyond the symbolic, 
representational, and cultural dimension exclusively ascribed to discrimination 
when it is construed as the negation of recognition.144
There are, however, two difficulties with the idea that the wrong of discrimi-
nation derives from a redistributive concern about access to basic goods. First, 
the Supreme Court of Canada has historically been reticent to find violations 
of section 15(1) of the Charter when equality claimants challenge laws on the 
basis that they deny access to basic goods. Judy Fudge claims: “The closer an 
equality claim is pitched to the recognition pole of the injustice spectrum, the 
more likely that the Supreme Court of Canada will uphold it.”145 Similarly, Ran 
Hirschl argues that despite Canada’s strong commitment to Keynesian welfare 
state values, section 15(1) of the Charter has not been interpreted to protect 
subsistence rights to basic goods. The Court “has repeatedly rejected claims that 
would have required the state to provide benefits to rights holders, either directly 
through a social program (e.g., health care, unemployment benefits) or indirectly 
142. Moreau, “Wrongs of Unequal Treatment,” supra note 40 at 307-308. Réaume similarly 
argues that the denial of benefits makes discrimination wrong, but reduces this factor to its 
infringement of human dignity, writing that it is wrongful “only if the benefit at stake is 
important to a life of dignity.” Réaume, “Dignity and Discrimination,” supra note 139 at 
687. For other authors who interpret the concept of equality in terms of sufficient access to 
important basic goods, see Derek Parfit, “Equality or Priority?” (1997) 10:3 Nous 202; Harry 
Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal” (1987) 98:1 Ethics 21.
143. Moreau, “Wrongs of Unequal Treatment,” supra note 40 at 309 [original emphasis removed].
144. On the difference between recognition and redistribution, see Fraser, supra note 42 at 68-75; 
Fudge, supra note 66 at 339-50; Sujit Choudhry, “Distribution vs. Recognition: The Case of 
Antidiscrimination Laws” (2000) 9:1 Geo Mason L Rev 145.
145. Fudge, supra note 66 at 341. See also Andrée Lajoie, Éric Gélineau & Richard Janda, “When 
Silence is no Longer Acquiescence: Gays and Lesbians under Canadian Law” (1999) 14:1 
CJLS 101, cited in Fudge, supra note 66 at 341. Lajoie, Gélineau and Janda argue that 
“[t]o the extent that Charter claims brought by lesbians and gay men cleave closely to the 
recognition pole of injustice claims and do not involve redistribution they are likely to be 
upheld” (ibid at 342).
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through legislation that imposes obligations on private actors.”146 These observa-
tions suggest that an account of the wrong of discrimination that appeals to the 
negation of recognition—such as the account generated by Substantive Equality 
as Equal Recognition—is a more viable candidate for a juridical conception 
of substantive equality under the Charter than an account which appeals to 
redistributive concerns, such as the denial of access to basic goods.
The second difficulty with an access to basic goods approach is found at a 
deeper conceptual level. The difficulty is that our intuitions about discrimina-
tion and the denial of access to basic goods seem to come apart too easily for the 
former to be a plausible explanation of the latter.
On the one hand, a citizen can be denied access to basic goods by the state 
without intuitively being (at least directly) discriminated against. The state might 
deny her unemployment insurance for reasons concerning redistributive policy 
and fiscal responsibility that are not intentionally discriminatory. Alternatively, 
a state official could deny certain benefits to a politically antagonistic group of 
physically disabled individuals, not because of their membership in that group 
but simply to seek revenge for such political antagonism. To fix ideas we could 
further imagine that if the antagonistic group was characterized by a different 
prohibited ground of discrimination, for example, age, the official would still 
have denied it benefits out of a vengeful motive without regard for the group’s 
characteristics. The denials of goods in these situations might of course be 
wrongful, but that does not seem to be because they are discriminatory.
On the other hand, we can imagine a situation in which members of a group 
of citizens are directly discriminated against because of their membership in that 
group, but where these citizens are not denied access to basic goods. Consider a 
society containing a status hierarchy between speakers of English as the dominant 
group and speakers of French as the subordinate group. English-speakers oppress 
French-speakers by defining the French linguistic heritage as deviant relative to 
the English linguistic heritage. Suppose that the state in this society enacts a law 
that prohibits the use of the French language in the public sphere. According to 
Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition, this law is discriminatory because its 
146. Ran Hirschl, “Canada’s Contribution to the Comparative Study of Rights and Judicial 
Review” in Linda A White et al, eds, The Comparative Turn in Canadian Political Science 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 77 at 84-85. Among the cases that Hirschl cites to support 
this claim are Gosselin, in which the Court decided that s 15(1) does not entail substantive 
obligations to provide adequately for disadvantaged groups relying on social assistance, and 
Auton, in which the Court held that provincial health care plans are not required to fund 
special treatment regimes for autistic children. See Gosselin, supra note 31; Auton (Guardian 
ad litem of ) v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 78, [2004] 3 SCR 657.
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vertical application reflects the English-French status hierarchy that exists horizon-
tally in the hypothesized society. Its outcome is the negation of the recognition of 
French-speakers’ authentic self-conceptualization of their own identities.
It might be argued that what makes this scenario discriminatory is not 
the negation of recognition of French-speakers’ identity, but the fact that the 
prohibition of the French language in the public sphere denies French-speakers 
access to certain basic goods, such as the court system or other mechanisms of 
government. We can, however, modify the scenario by supposing further that, 
whenever a French-speaker applies to engage the courts or for access to a particular 
benefit conferred by the state, she is given a French-English interpreter that 
allows her to navigate the system designed to confer the benefit notwithstanding 
her inability to understand English. We can then see that the scenario contains 
discriminatory treatment explicable by the negation of recognition even though 
it allows for subordinate groups to have comprehensive access to basic goods.
These difficulties lead to the conclusion that the denial of access to basic 
goods is not a plausible explanation of the wrong of discrimination. Moreover, 
an account of the wrong of discrimination in terms of the negation of recognition 
succeeds where the account in terms of access to basic goods fails.
It is important to note, however, that it does not follow from this conclusion 
that a wrongful consequence of the negation of recognition could be a distributive 
injustice whereby subordinate groups are denied access to basic goods. Indeed, 
one effective way to ameliorate the condition of those who suffer a negation 
of recognition that is given the force of law could be to redistribute economic 
resources to them.147 Furthermore, it does not follow that redressing the situation 
of those who lack access to basic goods, such as the homeless and indigent, is 
not an important public goal to be pursued. The above conclusion only entails 
that such a goal is not identical to the goal of eliminating discrimination against 
subordinate groups. The former goal responds to the interest in satisfying basic 
human needs, rather than the interest in anti-discrimination. In Iris Marion 
Young’s words, the moral obligation to improve the material situation of the least 
well-off “derives not from the fact of inequality as such, but from the fact of need. 
It is wrong for some people to lack what they need to live a minimally decent life 
when others are able to contribute to meeting those needs at relatively little costs 
to themselves.”148
147. Fraser, supra note 42 at 72-73; Balkin, supra note 41 at 2322.
148. Iris Marion Young, “Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice” (2001) 
9:1 Pol Theory 1 at 7.
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B. RESPONSES TO COMPETING UNITARY THEORIES
In positing the negation of recognition as explanatorily basic, the account of the 
wrong of discrimination generated by Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition 
also invites the objection that other singular factors besides the negation of 
recognition constitute the basic explanation of the wrong of discrimination. Such 
competing unitary theories might alternatively appeal to either the wrong of 
violating human dignity or the wrong of violating autonomy as the sole wrong of 
discrimination. I will consider and criticize these two contentions in what follows.
1. HUMAN DIGNITY-BASED THEORIES
It is well known that in Law, Justice Iacobucci identified the purpose of section 
15(1) of the Charter as the protection of human dignity.149 Despite acknowl-
edging the indeterminacy and abstractness of the concept of human dignity,150 he 
defined it in terms of the values of individual self-worth, self-respect, and physical 
and psychological integrity and empowerment. In a manner that tellingly mirrors 
the importance of subordinate social groups’ recognition under the theory of 
Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition, Justice Iacobucci wrote that human 
dignity is infringed “when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or 
devalued,” and is enhanced “when laws recognize the full place of all individuals 
and groups within Canadian society.”151 As we shall see momentarily, this parallel 
is far from coincidental.
It is also well known that the human dignity approach to section 15(1) 
was repudiated in Kapp. In that case, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice 
Abella, relying on voluminous academic criticism, offered three reasons for this 
repudiation. First, human dignity is an “abstract and subjective notion” that 
makes it “confusing and difficult to apply.”152 Second, its adoption as a legal test 
in Law imposed an additional burden of proof on equality claimants instead of 
providing enhanced protection against discrimination. Third, the legal test from 
Law permitted a formalistic approach to analyzing equality claims resembling 
the similarly situated test when used to identify relevant comparator groups.153
The view that the violation of human dignity explains the wrong of discrimi-
nation under section 15(1) has survived notwithstanding its repudiation in 
149. See Law, supra note 6 at para 51.
150. Ibid at para 52.
151. Ibid at para 53.
152. Kapp, supra note 6 at para 22.
153. Ibid.
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Kapp. Justice LeBel adopted it in his dissenting judgment on how to interpret 
section 15(1) in Quebec v A. He wrote that “[the] value of substantive equality 
at the heart of s. 15 is closely tied to the concept of human dignity,” and that 
the purpose of section 15(1) is “to eliminate any possibility of a person being 
treated in substance as ‘less worthy’ than others.”154 However, I contend that the 
view cannot ground a plausible juridical conception of the wrong of discrimina-
tion under section 15(1). This is partly because the protection of human dignity 
underlies all the rights within the Charter as a whole.
Chief Justice Dickson first stated that the protection of human dignity 
underlies all Charter rights in R v Oakes.155 Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice 
Abella adopted his reasoning when they rejected a human dignity-based 
account of the wrong of discrimination in Kapp.156 Indeed, the Court has held 
that a violation of human dignity explains the wrong of being deprived of life, 
liberty, and security of the person in a manner that does not accord with the 
principles of fundamental justice, contrary to section 7 of the Charter157 and 
the wrong of unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter.158 
Furthermore, in Health Services and Support—Facilities Subsector Bargaining 
Assn v British Columbia,159 the Court held that collective bargaining is consti-
tutionally protected as an incident of the fundamental freedom of association 
guaranteed by section 2(d) of the Charter. The majority judgment in that case 
argued that the protection of collective bargaining promotes the constellation 
154. Quebec v A, supra note 7 at para 138, citing Gosselin, supra note 31 at para 138.
155. [1986] 1 SCR 103 at para 64, 26 DLR (4th) 200.
156. McLachlin CJ and Abella J wrote: “the protection of all of the rights guaranteed by 
the Charter has as its lodestar the promotion of human dignity.” See Kapp, supra 
note 6 at para 21.
157. See e.g. R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 44 DLR (4th) 385, Wilson J; Rodriguez v British 
Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519 at para 21, 107 DLR (4th) 342. For 
discussion of the general point made in this sentence, see Donna Greschner, “The Purpose 
of Canadian Equality Rights” (2002) 6:1 Rev Const Stud 291 at 302. It has even been 
claimed that the protection of human dignity is a principle that has been adopted to explain 
the underlying values of constitutional rights in other jurisdictions, such as Germany and 
South Africa. See e.g. Lorraine E Wienrib, “Human Dignity as a Rights-Protecting Principle” 
(2004/2005) 17 NJCL 325; Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt, “Facing the Challenge 
of Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of 
Equality” (1998) 14:2 SAJHR 248 at 249; Dennis M Davis, “The Underlying Theory that 
Informs the Wording of Our Bill of Rights” (1996) 113:3 SALJ 385 at 385. See also Baines, 
supra note 29 at 74.
158. See e.g. R v Edwards, [1996] 1 SCR 128 at para 50, 132 DLR (4th) 31; R v Godoy, [1999] 1 
SCR 311 at para 19, 168 DLR (4th) 257.
159. 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391.
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of values underlying the Charter as a whole, which includes first and foremost 
human dignity.160
The value of human dignity therefore cannot explain the wrong of discrimi-
nation under section 15(1) in a way that is unique to and characteristic of the 
Charter’s guarantee of equality.161 By contrast, Substantive Equality as Equal 
Recognition’s explanation, which appeals to the negation of recognition, can do 
so because, as I have argued, it is disclosed by the foundational legal principles of 
equality outlined by Justice McIntyre in Andrews.
The inability of human dignity to uniquely demarcate the territory of section 
15(1) evinces a second difficulty with using the concept to explain the wrong 
of discrimination. As was pointed out in Kapp—and, as mentioned earlier, 
even to some extent by Justice Iacobucci in Law—human dignity is too vague, 
malleable, abstract, and indeterminate a value to ground a conceptually rigorous 
understanding of the wrong of discrimination.162 While specifying the meaning 
of human dignity is a subject of controversy, a common starting point is the 
notion that for the state to treat all its citizens with equal dignity is to treat 
them with equal concern, respect, and consideration.163 Since a human being has 
incomparable worth, she may be treated only as an end in herself, rather than a 
means for achieving some other desirable end.
Now, to be sure, this definition of human dignity might also be seen as 
underlying Charter rights other than section 15(1), such as the right against 
self-incrimination guaranteed by section 13.164 Setting this difficulty aside, it 
is not surprising that agreement should coalesce around what is still an overly 
abstract definition of human dignity.165 The problem is that, even if this definition 
160. Ibid at paras 81-82.
161. Greschner, supra note 157 at 317.
162. For authors who argue along these lines, see Sonia Lawrence, “Harsh, Perhaps Even 
Misguided: Developments in Law, 2002” (2002) 20 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 93 at 96-100 
[Lawrence, “Developments in Law”]; Moreau, “Wrongs of Unequal Treatment,” supra note 
40 at 296; McIntyre, supra note 32 at 102.
163. For the classic statement of this notion, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977) at 272-73. It was adopted by Iacobucci 
J in Law as a definition of when the state treats all citizens with equal dignity. See Law, 
supra note 6 at para 51. For discussion of how the theory of Substantive Equality as Equal 
Recognition would interpret this abstract notion of human dignity that runs through the 
equality jurisprudence, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
164. The idea is that requiring an individual to furnish evidence herself is to treat her as a mere 
means for achieving the end of crime control. See Hamish Stewart, “The Confessions Rule 
and the Charter” (2009) 54:3 McGill LJ 517 at 520-21.
165. Greschner, supra note 157 at 317, n 99.
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is accepted, the notion that the state should treat all citizens as ends does not 
have sufficient explanatory content to tell us what kinds of state treatment fail 
to show respect for a human being’s incomparable worth. One would therefore 
expect that any attempt to clarify the abstract notion would collapse it into a 
more determinate ideal that can better explain the nature of state action that 
treats citizens as means. The upshot would be that any appeal to human dignity 
itself is redundant.166
To take an illustrative example, Denise Réaume’s sustained attempt to 
elucidate a human dignity-based conception of the wrong of discrimination 
succumbs to precisely this problem. Réaume highlights two reasons why human 
beings have inherent dignity. First, we are capable of having a conception of the 
self, which makes respect for our identity essential to our dignity. Second, we are 
capable of choosing and pursuing a conception of the good, which makes respect 
for our plans and projects essential to our dignity.167 However, the link between 
human dignity and identity makes Réaume’s human dignity-based account 
collapse into an account premised on the negation of recognition, which, as I have 
argued, is wrong because of how it obscures the authentic identity of members 
of subordinate groups in horizontal status hierarchies. Furthermore, the link 
between human dignity and the ability to choose and pursue a conception of the 
good collapses Réaume’s account into one premised on the values of self-determi-
nation and individual autonomy. This latter conflation is shared by the definition 
of human dignity espoused by Justice LeBel in Quebec v A:
The principle of personal autonomy or self-determination, to which self-worth, self-
confidence and self-respect are tied, is an integral part of the values of dignity and 
freedom that underlie the [Charter’s] equality guarantee … Safeguarding personal 
autonomy implies the recognition of each individual’s right to make decisions 
regarding his or her own person, to control his or her bodily integrity and to 
pursue his or her own conception of a full and rewarding life free from government 
interference with fundamental personal choices.168
Because a human dignity-based conception of the wrong of discrimination is 
liable to collapse into competing accounts when one tries to define human dignity, 
it is preferable to discard that value and adopt one of the competing accounts. 
This approach is more likely to yield a conceptually rigorous understanding of 
the wrong of discrimination.
166. Moreau, “Wrongs of Unequal Treatment,” supra note 40 at 296.
167. Réaume, “Dignity and Discrimination,” supra note 139 at 677.
168. Quebec v A, supra note 7 at para 139.
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In summary, I maintain that the concept of human dignity is, under closer 
inspection, an empty vessel that must be filled with the values countenanced 
by competing theories of the wrong of discrimination, in particular the value 
of authentic identity countenanced by recognition theory. Human dignity is “a 
jurisprudential Legoland—to be used in whatever form and shape is required 
by the demands of the judicial designer.”169 The position I maintain is, however, 
compatible with regarding human dignity, which is after all one of the organizing 
principles of the Charter as a whole, as an abstract regulative ideal in which more 
precise theories of the wrong of discrimination ought to participate.170 Indeed, 
when elucidating the theory of recognition that he defends, Taylor himself seems 
to suggest that this is the proper way to situate the value of recognition in relation 
to the concept of human dignity.171
2. AUTONOMY-BASED THEORIES
I have touched on the autonomy-based conception of the wrong of discrimina-
tion several times. Justice LeBel appeared to have this conception in mind in 
Quebec v A when he advanced the view that human dignity is the animating 
norm of section 15(1) of the Charter. Here, I shall criticize the autonomy-based 
account and, in the process, defend the account of the wrong of discrimination 
as the negation of recognition.
What does it mean to say that discrimination is wrong because of the wrong 
of violating individual autonomy? To be autonomous is to be self-determining, 
and to be self-determining is to be able to choose and pursue a conception of the 
good life free from interference by others, particularly the state. The importance 
of free and independent choice therefore lies at the heart of the protection of 
autonomy.172 Autonomy is violated by the state if the state treats citizens in a way 
that does not accord with the choices they have made. Treatment of this sort is 
wrong because it violates the general moral principle that the state’s treatment 
of citizens should not be based on factors that are “arbitrary from a moral point 
of view,”173 such as the personal characteristics, attributes, and circumstances of 
individuals that are not chosen.
169. DM Davis, “Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence” (1999) 116:1 SALJ 398 at 
413. See also Lawrence, “Developments in Law,” supra note 162 at 96-100.
170. Moreau, “Wrongs of Unequal Treatment,” supra note 40 at 296.
171. Taylor, supra note 43 at 37-41. See also Réaume, “Dignity and Discrimination,” supra note 
139 at 677, n 106.
172. Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 127 at 5.
173. This phrase of course is borrowed from John Rawls. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971) at 15.
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The view that the violation of autonomy is what makes discrimination 
wrong under section 15(1) of the Charter receives support from the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision in Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern 
Affairs). The majority in that case stated that the prohibited grounds of discrimi-
nation under section 15(1) are immutable or constructively immutable personal 
characteristics; that is, either they are unchosen or to choose to change them is 
unfeasible because of the severe damage to individuality that such a choice would 
cause.174 Following Corbiere, one might argue that to be discriminated against on 
the basis of a prohibited ground by the state is to have one’s autonomy violated, 
since it is to be treated arbitrarily in a way that does not reflect one’s choices.175 
On this argument, the prohibited grounds represent instances of personal charac-
teristics that are likely to be arbitrary.176 The wrong of discrimination therefore 
stems from the wrong of arbitrary state treatment that violates autonomy.
It might appear that, on the understanding of individual autonomy employed 
by this argument, the value of recognition collapses into that of autonomy. I hold 
that a person’s self-understanding of her authentic identity as a worthy starting 
point from which to pursue a conception of the good depends on its recognition 
as similarly worthy simply because of its particularity to herself. The importance 
of recognition of a person’s identity is, however, not identical to the importance 
of her ability to choose a conception of the good. Recognition is conceptually 
prior to autonomy. Our authentic identity is the “background against which 
our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense.”177 Choosing 
a conception of the good requires a person to have a background set of values 
and preferences in terms of which a conception of the good seems attractive or 
worthwhile to her. My authentic identity constitutes the dialogically constructed 
framework that I bring to bear on choosing between different conceptions of 
the good. From the perspective of this framework, I can regard a particular life 
project as worth choosing, given my life style and cultural context. Or, indeed, if 
the project is marked by high social prestige but I cannot regard my identity with 
similar esteem due to its denial of social recognition as worthy of the project, 
I may regard it as something that I am not worthy of pursuing. For recognition 
174. Corbiere, supra note 22 at para 13.
175. But see Moon, supra note 126 at 113.
176. Choudhry, supra note 143 at 154 [emphasis in original]. Choudhry does not necessarily 
endorse the autonomy-based account of the wrong of discrimination. In his article he simply 
describes the account.
177. Taylor, supra note 43 at 33-34.
SANGIULIANO, SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 641
theory, a person strives not only for an autonomously chosen life but also for an 
individuated life that makes sense to her given her socially-situated identity.178
This distinction between recognition and autonomy is significant when 
we consider a first problem for autonomy-based conceptions of the wrong of 
discrimination. The problem is that there can be situations where a person is 
denied autonomy but is not intuitively suffering discrimination and, conversely, 
situations where a person is intuitively suffering discrimination but is not denied 
autonomy. Paralleling the deficiency in an access-to-basic-goods approach 
to the wrong of discrimination, autonomy and discrimination seem to come 
apart too easily for the denial of the former to be a plausible explanation for the 
wrong of the latter.
To appreciate this problem, we must note that the protection and promotion 
of autonomy within a society requires the state to establish what Joseph Raz refers 
to as the “conditions of autonomy.”179 Among these conditions is the provision 
of an adequate range of options from which citizens can choose and pursue a 
conception of the good. Without adequate options, an individual may be forced 
by circumstance or the acts of others to adopt a particular life plan. If that occurs, 
she does not genuinely choose that life plan but is rather coerced into it.180
Now, the state can deny a person’s autonomy by revoking the adequate 
range of options necessary for her to exercise her free choice without intuitively 
discriminating against her in the process. For example, the state might imprison 
a citizen who has been convicted of a criminal offence. The imprisoned criminal 
does not suffer discrimination due to the simple fact of having been deprived of 
the range of options from which to choose a conception of the good. To consider 
a more fanciful example, the state might close all institutions of post-secondary 
education within its jurisdiction. In this situation, an individual citizen loses the 
option of acquiring post-secondary education, and therefore has her autonomy is 
diminished, but she is not intuitively discriminated against.
Conversely, the state might successfully provide a citizen with an adequate 
range of options to choose a conception of the good, but the citizen could still 
suffer from discrimination. Consider a patriarchal society where women have 
historically experienced oppression and subordination in the form of being 
legally denied access to certain high-prestige and high-paying occupations and 
positions of political power. Over time, the male-dominated controlling powers 
of the state in this society realize the error of their ways and formally open all 
178. Honneth, supra note 63 at 195.
179. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 425.
180. Ibid at 425, 155-56, 369.
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careers and positions to women. In this society, despite the removal of barriers 
that have historically diminished the range of options and life projects open to 
women, women may have internalized a self-understanding of inferiority relative 
to men. If so, as Taylor writes, “even when some of the objective obstacles to 
their advancement fall away, they may be incapable of taking advantage of the 
new opportunities.”181
By hypothesis, in the society just described there is an adequate range 
of options for women to choose a conception of the good. The autonomy of 
women is therefore protected. Nevertheless, the women’s internalization of their 
inferiority, stemming from the society’s history, intuitively moves us to view the 
society as deeply discriminatory. Discrimination against a particular woman in 
this society would then not be explicable by violations of her autonomy.
The story told of this society need not be restricted to the predicament of 
women. It could be applied to different racial or cultural groups. Such groups 
may be historically denied the range of options needed to possess autonomy. 
However, if they have internalized their historical inferiority, they may be unable 
to take advantage of the opportunities opened to them when adequate options 
are finally provided by the state. This self-deprecation then becomes “one of the 
most potent instruments of their own oppression.”182 We intuitively think that 
there is discrimination in such societies. This is so even though the groups who 
are discriminated against do not lack adequate options and, hence, have not been 
denied autonomy.
The account of discrimination as the negation of recognition can explain 
the wrong of discrimination occurring in the societies described above. There 
are status hierarchies existing horizontally within these societies. The life styles of 
subordinate groups—whether such groups are comprised of women, indigenous 
peoples or other groups of minority status—are interpreted as deviant or Other 
relative to the life styles of dominant groups. Subordinate groups are denied 
recognition of their authentic identities because their identities are constructed in 
juxtaposition to those of dominant groups. Historically, this situation has made 
subordinate groups internalize a negative self-understanding of their identities, 
cultural values, and life styles that persists even when the state in their society 
enhances their autonomy by creating an apparently adequate range of options for 
them. Members of subordinate groups do not see options that were once highly 
prestigious and exclusive to dominant groups as representing genuine life plans for 
181. Taylor, supra note 43 at 25.
182. Ibid at 26.
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them to choose. This is because the historical negation of the subordinate group’s 
recognition has made them see themselves as unworthy to choose these options.
There is a second problem for the autonomy-based account of the wrong of 
discrimination. In emphasizing the centrality of choice and self-determination, 
the account presupposes what I earlier referred to as an individualistic conception 
of the self. This supposition contrasts with the negation of recognition account, 
which assumes a relational conception of the self. There are, however, strong 
reasons to doubt the philosophical tenability and jurisprudential acceptability of 
an individualistic conception of the self.
At the philosophical level, the autonomy-based account’s notion that 
the state should treat citizens only in accordance with their choices, and not 
arbitrarily on the basis of unchosen factors, presumes that we can easily separate 
out what is chosen in a person’s identity from what is not. But such a task might 
be prohibitively difficult. As Samuel Scheffler writes:
In any sense of identity that actually matters to people, unchosen personal traits 
and the social circumstances into which one is born are importantly, albeit not 
exclusively, constitutive of one’s distinctive identity. And, in any ordinary sense 
of “voluntary,” people’s voluntary choices are routinely influenced by unchosen 
features of their personalities, temperaments, and the social contexts in which they 
find themselves.183
Similarly, the choices a person has made sometimes seem morally irrelevant 
to whether that person should receive certain benefits or shoulder certain burdens. 
For example, we do not withhold medical treatment from persons in desperate 
need of attention if they have an unchosen illness caused by congenital disease. 
Nor do we do so if they have sustained an injury from a foolhardy risk they have 
chosen to take.184
On the jurisprudential point, I have mentioned above that the Supreme 
Court of Canada has recently rejected an individualistic conception of the self 
in Quebec v A185 and, more recently still, in Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford. 
Quebec v A established the (near) irrelevance of individual choice in section 
15(1) cases.186 Bedford was not an equality case. It concerned the constitutional 
validity of Criminal Code prohibitions on communicating in public for the 
purposes of prostitution, operating a common bawdyhouse, and living on the 
avails of prostitution. A unanimous Court held that these prohibitions violated 
183. Supra note 66 at 18.
184. Ibid at 19.
185. Quebec v A, supra note 7 at para 342.
186. Ibid at paras 333, 335, 343. See also Miron, supra note 6 at para 153.
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prostitutes’ section 7 Charter right to life, liberty, and security of the person in 
a manner that did not accord with the principles of fundamental justice. Chief 
Justice McLachlin rejected the government’s argument that it was prostitutes’ 
free choice, not the impugned provisions, that posed the risks to prostitutes’ 
life, liberty, and security of the person complained of in the case. She wrote that 
“while some prostitutes may fit the description of persons who freely choose (or 
at one time chose) to engage in the risky economic activity of prostitution, many 
prostitutes have no meaningful choice but to do so.”187 She added: “Whether 
because of financial desperation, drug addictions, mental illness, or compulsion 
from pimps, they often have little choice but to sell their bodies for money.”188
In this way, the Court in Bedford ostensibly confirmed Scheffler’s claim 
that unchosen features of individuals’ personalities, temperaments, and the 
social contexts in which they find themselves routinely influence their choices. 
There is therefore good reason to doubt whether an autonomy-based account 
of the wrong of discrimination can effectively ground a juridical conception of 
substantive equality and the wrong of discrimination.
V. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE 
EQUALITY AS EQUAL RECOGNITION FOR THE TENSION 
BETWEEN CERTAINTY AND FLEXIBILITY IN QUEBEC V A
Where does Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition leave us as regards the 
tension between certainty and flexibility that divided the judges in the recent 
Supreme Court of Canada case of Quebec v A? Recall that Justice LeBel’s dissenting 
judgment in the case attempted to secure a measure of certainty for section 15(1) 
of the Charter. He offered a thorough articulation of the provision’s underlying 
values and insisted that prejudice and stereotyping are crucial factors that make a 
law discriminatory. Justice Abella, in her majority judgment, held simply that the 
purpose of section 15(1) is to protect the norm of substantive equality. A law’s 
inconsistency with that norm is what makes it discriminatory, no matter how 
that inconsistency is identified.
I began this article by discussing Quebec v A to suggest that clarifying 
the concept of substantive equality would be a significant contribution to the 
scholarship on the constitutional right to equality in Canada. I will conclude by 
discussing briefly how Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition might provide 
187. Bedford, supra note 130 at para 86.
188. Ibid.
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a way to navigate the judges’ disagreement in Quebec v A. I suggest that the theory 
presents a thorough articulation of the underlying value of section 15(1) and that 
it does so in a way that directs adjudicators to examine the impact or effects of 
a law’s formal application within the social context in which the law is applied.
Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition clarifies what the state of affairs of 
substantive equality is supposed to be by describing what the world and the law 
should look like when the ideal is instantiated. In doing so, this approach clarifies 
what kind of value adjudicators ought to be sensitive to when they determine 
whether legislation is discriminatory within the meaning of section 15(1). It 
maintains that the state of affairs of substantive equality is a condition in which a 
law does not transmit through its vertical impact horizontal inequalities that take 
the form of status hierarchies. Moreover, the wrong of discrimination consists in 
the negation of the value of recognition for members of subordinate social groups 
in society. Hence, the theory advances beyond an impoverished construction of 
substantive equality as a mere methodological principle. It aspires to achieve the 
certainty for the Court’s equality jurisprudence that Justice LeBel tried to secure 
by articulating in considerable detail the values of human dignity and personal 
autonomy that underlie section 15(1).
Nonetheless, the theory is consistent with the flexible approach to section 
15(1) that won over a majority of the judges in Quebec v A. It maintains that a 
law is discriminatory not because of its form, i.e., its equal vertical application 
to all those who it catches within its ambit, but because of its context, i.e., how 
it transmits patterns of horizontal inequality existing in the social structure 
within which it formally applies. The manner in which a law could reflect 
status hierarchies is diverse and multifaceted, as we have seen inter alia in 
the pre-Charter Bill of Rights cases. Hence, there can be no definitive rule, no 
“doctrinal formulation or carefully enumerated series of steps and questions,”189 
to dictate how such reflection must be identified. Rather, what is required is a 
contextual approach that, following the prevalent methodological construction of 
substantive equality, draws on a non-exhaustive190 set of indicia of this reflection, 
such as prejudice, stereotyping, and the Law contextual factors, to examine the 
outcomes or effects of a law’s vertical application on horizontal social relations. 
On the view of substantive equality defended in this article, what makes a law 
discriminatory is, above all else, its transmission of unequal status hierarchies, no 
matter how this transmission is identified.
189. Young, supra note 21 at 198.
190. For examples of other potential factors, see Sheppard, supra note 20 at 51-52.
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The approach recommended by Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition 
does not, however, disregard Sheppard’s caution that a proposal to use any relevant 
factors to identify a law’s discriminatory effects fails to provide adequate guidance 
to adjudicators and litigants in equality cases. To come full circle, this is because 
the theory thoroughly articulates the state of affairs of substantive equality that 
the Charter requires a law to instantiate and the value of recognition that is 
infringed by state-perpetrated discrimination. Together, these ideas constitute 
the norm towards which adjudicators and litigants are to be guided when they 
employ multiple indicia to identify a law’s discriminatory impact in the context 
in which the law applies.
